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Abstract  
In the two decades prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the Mexican government pursued 
policies aimed at liberalizing markets, while simultaneously trying to ensure the stability of the 
peso. These policies consisted of monetary and fiscal controls to keep inflation low and free 
trade agreements to reduce Mexico’s dependence on the United States. The policies significantly 
reduced the country’s public deficit and were implemented in hopes that they would help reduce 
the country’s exposure to currency crises.  
Yet, despite all provisions the Mexican government put in place, the country’s peso still 
lost two percent of its value in the first three days following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
the US-based investment firm. The loss was significant given the average appreciation of the 
peso in the months leading up to the crisis was one percent per month, and given that not enough 
time had passed to fully understand the impact that bankruptcy would have had on Mexico. By 
the following Monday, the peso recovered all of its lost value, suggesting that investors were 
uncertain about the true impact the events unfolding in the United States would have on 
Mexico’s economy. It also suggested that the uncertainty and negative sentiment within the 
market during the initial week of the global crisis played a stronger role in the rapid depreciation 
and recovery of the peso than changes in market fundamentals. 
Using an inductive analysis of the historical events, this thesis suggests the circumstances 
in which sentiment engendered by mainstream media and distributed through digital channels 
during the financial crisis could have contributed to the dramatic short-term swings in the price 
of the peso. Specifically, this paper focuses on the new, digital information technologies, their 
use among investors as a means for financial research, and the role of high-frequency trading 
(HFT) algorithms in initiating information cascades. HFT algorithms account for nearly 70 
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percent of daily trading volume in financial markets and can magnify negative market sentiment 
among rational investors. Utilizing historical trading data for the peso and headlines and tweets 
published by the Thomson Reuters news group during the crisis, I seek to illustrate the 
correlations between market sentiment manifest in digital media and the price movements of the 
peso, indicating possible herd behavior tendencies in the form of information cascades.  
Though it is not possible to empirically separate the market movements of  informed 
decision-makers from the information cascades of investors and HFT algorithms reacting to 
media, the fact that information cascades can and do exist as demonstrated by specific examples 
in this paper has significant implications for the Mexican peso. The existence of information 
cascades implies that having strong macroeconomic fundamentals is no longer an adequate safe 
guard against the immediate impacts of external crises. As social media becomes the main source 
of breaking news and market sentiment for mainstream media and investors, it becomes vital for 
emerging countries such as Mexico to monitor social platforms for sentiment related to the 
domestic economy in order to proactively address investor pessimism. Finally, emerging country 
governments can utilize these platforms to push out relevant and truthful information about the 
economy in order to diminish investor uncertainty and minimize the impact of externally-
induced information cascades. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The twenty-first century has been defined by the introduction of advanced internet and 
digital technologies that have fundamentally changed the way the world connects and gathers 
information. While this new technology has created significant societal benefits through 
information aggregation and social connectivity, it has also intimately connected financial 
markets around the world in ways that had not been possible prior to the invention of the 
internet.  
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 exposed these connections and fully 
demonstrated how the perceptions of weakness found in one economy could be transferred to 
economies across the globe. The speed at which new information technology allowed investors 
to both observe and react to new information and market sentiment globally magnified the 
opportunities for investors to mimic one another. When uncertainty was prevalent during the first 
week of the crisis and new information was limited to speculation, this mimicking behavior 
became more severe as investors looked to the markets to determine which actions they should 
take.  As major investment banks in the United States started to fail in 2008, the resulting 
uncertainty triggered a worldwide panic. In an attempt to limit losses, investors looked to the 
markets and mainstream media to determine which assets they should buy or sell.  This created a 
situation where some assets lost significant value within hours of being perceived as too risky, 
including assets such as the Mexican peso. 
 Mexico was the Latin American economy most affected by the crisis. The country’s ties 
to the United States and past issues with currency crises made it an easy target of investor 
pessimism, despite the country’s prior and contemporaneous attempts to reduce its 
macroeconomic exposure to financial crises outside of its domestic economy. As the crisis 
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unfolded, Mexico’s economic outlook appeared to worsen; the peso devalued at an average rate 
of one percentage point per day from September to October 2008, while the previous average 
variability in the year prior to the crisis was a gain of one percent per month (Banco de México, 
“Foreign Exchange Market (Exchange Rates)”). The swift change in sentiment about the peso 
indicated that perceptions of risk were playing a larger role in the currency’s valuation than 
visible changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Using an inductive analysis of the historical events of the global recession, this thesis 
suggests the circumstances in which sentiment published by mainstream media and distributed 
through digital channels during the crisis could have contributed to the short-term dramatic 
swings in the price of the peso. Specifically, this paper focuses on the role of new digital 
information technologies, such as the use of search engines and social media as a means of 
research among investors, and the use of high-frequency trading (HFT) algorithms – which 
account for nearly 70 percent of daily trading volume in financial markets – can initiate an 
information cascade, increasing pessimism among rational investors. Utilizing historical trading 
data for the peso and headlines and tweets published by the Thomson Reuters news group during 
the crisis, I seek to illustrate the correlations between market sentiment and the price movements 
of the peso, indicating possible herd behavior tendencies in the form of information cascades. 
Information Cascades 
Information cascades are periods of time in which the reaction of few individuals or 
groups to a change in news or sentiment causes other investors to disregard their own 
information in favor of taking the same actions of the first movers, believing that those first few 
individuals or groups have better information than them. This “herd” behavior of mimicking the 
first movers can be rational in periods of high uncertainty, when both limited information and 
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time constraints incentivize individuals to follow the behaviors of perceived “experts” rather than 
risk the chances of possible losses that might occur when taking the time to gather all the 
necessary information themselves. 
 However, as more individuals choose to disregard their own information in favor of 
following the group, asset prices can gain momentum and move too far away from fundamental 
values. As several individuals realize that prices are out of alignment and begin to take actions 
contrary to the actions of the group, then the cascade “breaks,” allowing asset prices to 
eventually return to levels that are closer to their true values. These sudden losses and gains that 
occur during and after an information cascade increase the short-term volatility of asset prices in 
the markets. Thus in the short-term, volatility inhibits market prices from being a reliable source 
of information about the true value of an asset. 
Noting the presence of information cascades during the 2008 financial crisis is important 
because it provides one possible explanation for the astounding effect that a crisis in the United 
States had on Mexico beyond just the effects of trade. Given that Mexico was experiencing one 
of its most stable political and economic periods in decades and had no immediately visible ties 
to the finance instruments that were negatively affecting large investment firms in the United 
States, it appears that the effect the first week of the financial crisis had on Mexico was the direct 
result of fear – a real and rational fear that the chaos in the United States would somehow send 
Mexico into a currency crisis. 
Inspiration Behind the Research 
This research is an extension of my interest in the 2008 global financial crisis which 
began in 2008, when I was a sophomore in college. At the time, I was taking an economics 
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course titled “Money, Credit and Banking,” and my professor proclaimed that the crisis was an 
excellent case study of the intricacies of financial markets. 
Unfortunately, it was a lousy time to be a college student. During that semester one of my 
parents became a victim of the layoffs that were all too common during that period. With that job 
went all sense of financial security and a significant portion of my college tuition. Determined to 
uncover the source of all the distress, I devoted my senior honors thesis research to figuring out 
who or what was the cause of the crisis. I quickly realized that the situation was a lot more 
complex than I had previously expected. 
Five years later, my interest in the crisis expanded past the United States and into 
Mexico. I was curious why Mexico suffered significantly more than the United States, even 
though Mexico was not the source of the original economic crisis. Research conducted within the 
context of my Latin American studies curriculum caused me to explore some of the many 
possible causes of the crisis experienced in Mexico, from the on-going drug war, persistent 
poverty and the government’s emergency policy strategy.  
In my research I discovered a trend: a crisis usually originating in the United States 
would create economic turmoil in Mexico, forcing its government to scramble in order to stem 
the flight of capital out of the country. Each time, resources would be wiped out, and the middle 
and working classes would bear the brunt of sweeping unemployment, high inflation and abject 
poverty. It seemed that just as Mexico’s economy would start to gain momentum, a crisis would 
cause it to hit the proverbial “reset button,” forcing the country to start from scratch both 
politically and economically. 
I also noticed that with each crisis, the Mexican government put together provisions to 
hedge against future devastation. Budgets were balanced, trade was liberalized, debts were 
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reduced and emergency funds were gathered in preparation for the next major crisis. With each 
recession, Mexico addressed its vulnerabilities to external shocks with policy reform and new 
economic strategies. The 2008 financial crisis was the first time that Mexico had weathered such 
a severe global recession without experiencing a devastating currency crisis. Mexico 
implemented all of the latest macroeconomic strategies, including stimulating the economy, 
opening up currency swap credit lines with the United States and maintaining a balanced budget 
to demonstrate its fiscal restraint.  
Yet capital flight from the country was still severe. According to Sidaoui, Ramos-Francia 
and Cuadra (2011), “during the last quarter of that year [2008], total foreign investment was only 
around 10% of the level reached a year earlier,” with a capital outflow of nearly $10 billion USD 
from portfolio investments alone (pgs. 248-249). It appeared that foreign investors expected the 
worst in Mexico, despite the presence of decisive, calculated government interventions to shelter 
the domestic economy from harm. While the actions of the Mexican government ultimately 
helped the economy to recover after a swift and brutal recession, those actions seemed to do very 
little to affect investor sentiment about the country in the short-run until Mexico’s growth rate 
surpassed that of Brazil in 2010.  
I began to wonder if the source of the problem had more to do with investor sentiment 
rather than Mexico’s economic fundamentals. It seemed that many of the country’s financial 
problems were the result of actions taken by foreign investors that had a significant financial 
impact on the economy as a whole. I did not believe that investors were intentionally and 
maliciously trying to weaken Mexico’s economy; I did, however, believe there were certain 
aspects of investing behavior – such as the way information was gathered and used to make 
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decisions – that ultimately inhibited Mexico’s efforts to become an established economy. This 
thesis is the culmination of my findings. 
The Role of Uncertainty and Fear in Herd Behavior 
The rapid flight of capital away from both Mexico’s peso and stock without obvious 
cause indicates that perception was creating the panic, rather than the real economic conditions 
within Mexico. As had happened in past crises that affected Mexico, outside investors appeared 
to be participating in herd behavior, taking their investment funds out of the Mexican economy 
because other investors were doing the same thing. The main difference between the 2008 crisis 
and crises Mexico experienced previously was that the run on the currency was not triggered by 
the actions of the Mexican government. Instead, uncertainty was introduced to the global market 
as a whole when advanced economies started to experience a financial meltdown.  
Uncertainty plays an important role in herd behavior. It represents a change in closely 
held beliefs, forcing people to reevaluate their assumptions and the information they use when 
making decisions. From an investing standpoint, periods of uncertainty required new strategies to 
take into account new information about which investment will incur the greatest risk or bring 
about the greatest reward. The uncertainty also creates a sense of urgency; investors need to 
know what has changed and how that change affects their investments, before major financial 
losses are incurred. This urgency creates incongruities as investors seek out information, but fail 
to take time to ascertain the quality of the information before acting upon it.  
Yet uncertainty can also create opportunities for information exploitation. One of the 
main reasons investors may choose to act on new information before conducting a thorough 
analysis of an investment decision is the desire to make first-mover profits. Since their founding, 
financial markets at their core have been not only a compilation of funds but also a competition 
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among investors to make excess profits by being the first to exploit new information in the 
market. 
This competition is so prevalent in financial markets that entire companies have been 
created to find and distribute information quickly to investors willing to pay for it. The news 
agency Thomson Reuters was created from this competition when in 1851 founder and financial 
publisher Paul Julius Reuter used carrier pigeons to provide subscribers with breaking financial 
news days in advance of any other source (Reuters, n.d.). Now, instead of pigeons and 
newspapers, companies and investors are utilizing digital newswires and Twitter, incorporating 
this information into algorithms that automatically “read” and act on the news. 
The Role of Media and Technology in Information Cascades 
Yet while this race to “beat the market” is not new, the technology developed over the 
last decade to help companies exploit new information can have market-destabilizing effects. If 
investment companies seek out the same information for their automatic trading algorithms – via 
sources like Reuters’ digital newswire or Twitter feeds – then there is a chance that the trades 
completed by these algorithms can initiate information cascades. These cascades represent a type 
of herd behavior where snippets of information cause large, coordinated actions of asset buying 
or selling by groups of unrelated people and organizations, distorting the price of an asset 
significantly from its actual value. The speed at which technology and algorithms allow trades to 
be completed means that new information introduced to the market moves asset prices before it 
is humanly possible to pick up on subtle inaccuracies in the data. Thus even rumors could cause 
a tremendous swing in asset prices if accidentally published by a “validated” news source before 
the organization has a chance to redact the inaccuracies.  
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Inaccuracies in news data can be very common when reporting on breaking news, 
especially since news agencies are under just as much pressure to be the first to “get the 
exclusive” on an important story as investors are to be the first to use the information. Jack 
Shafer (2008), a journalist at Slate, a digital magazine owned by The Washington Post 
newspaper company, demonstrated the tendency of even “authoritative” news agencies such as 
The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal to print rumors as fact in an exposé about the 
inaccuracies published during the 2008 Mumbai massacre. “Breaking news,” he explains, 
“especially complex breaking news – has always defied the best reporter’s attempt to get the 
story both first and right.” Therefore, in situations of great uncertainty such as a crisis, when the 
need for timely and accurate information is most critical, it stands to reason that the news 
financial companies, investors and their algorithms rely on can often be wrong.  
In addition, research shows that when negative news is published, investors tend to 
overreact. According to economists Roberto Casarin and Flaminio Squazzoni (2013), “investors 
are more sensitive to negative news, especially when the market is dominated by uncertainty and 
unpredictability,” creating downward pressure on asset prices (p. 1). In addition, even the words 
journalists use to explain situations of uncertainty can affect the way a market behaves through a 
phenomenon known as the “framing effect.” Professor of media, public and international affairs 
Robert M. Entman explains the importance of framing, or the lens through which a problem is 
described: 
…the frame determines whether most people notice and how they understand and 
remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act upon it […] 
Receivers' responses are clearly affected if they perceive and process information about 
one interpretation and possess little or incommensurable data about alternatives. This is 
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why exclusion of interpretations by frames is as significant to outcomes as inclusion   
(pp. 53 & 54). 
In other words, if mainstream media print news about uncertainty in the markets through 
a very negative frame, and investors are limited in both their time and access to other data 
sources, then investors will react negatively and create even more volatility in the markets. This 
creates a situation where the sentiment of news articles solidifies the sentiment of the markets, 
making it difficult to objectively observe the events as they occur. For example, if investors feel 
pessimistic about the market, and then read articles from mainstream media reflecting that 
pessimism, then their concerns are in a way confirmed, even if no new hard information is 
presented about the actual state of the economy. This confirmation bias may prevent them from 
seeking out other sources of information that may contradict the pessimism. 
Negative framing may cause additional problems if it affects the actions of HFT 
algorithms. As will be discussed in detail below, HFT algorithms make up a significant portion 
of the total volume of trades completed in financial markets, meaning that their trades can visibly 
affect the overall market price of an asset. Since HFT algorithms make trades instantaneously 
based on a keyword and sentiment analysis of information published by mainstream media 
sources, a negatively framed article may be reflected in the stock price of an asset almost 
instantaneously, and before investors have a chance to read the information themselves.  
Thus by the time investors read the information published by mainstream media, the 
markets could have already reacted, confirming the suspicions of investors who were already 
pessimistic about the market. As these investors also choose to sell their stocks, asset prices 
continue to fall at a rapid rate. This can create conditions of uncertainty in which skeptical 
investors may wonder if they too should join in the sale of the asset, even if they may suspect 
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that the price of that asset is dropping below it actual value. When the uncertainty caused by 
rapid changes in the market environment cause investors to doubt their closely held beliefs, they 
may then start to looking for sources  of information they consider to be “authoritative” to see 
how they should react.  
Executive Business Editor of the Huffington Post Peter Goodman (2011) explained his 
experience working at the New York Times during the 2008 crisis and the kind of impact 
“authoritative” articles could have on the markets: 
Inside our newsroom in midtown Manhattan, we understood that we were not merely 
passive chroniclers of external events. The sportswriter can describe what is happening 
on the field from a dispassionate distance, without imagining that the words he types may 
somehow influence the events he is witnessing. Not so for those of us writing about the 
financial crisis: we were effectively on the field while the game was still under way. 
Investors and markets and ordinary people would move their money in reaction to what 
we and other major media were reporting, and this would in turn affect the policy 
climate, the perception of the need for emergency measures, the politics of the debate 
over those measures, and the public mood, which then reverberated back on everything 
else (p. 110). 
Money was made and lost by the trading algorithms and individuals that used mainstream 
media to determine what trades to make. When mainstream media chronicled the initial impact 
of the crisis on Mexico’s peso, the very words used to describe it increased the perceived 
riskiness of investing in the country by reflecting the pessimism of the market. Headlines such as 
“Mexico Peso Falls Over 1 pct on US Financial Woes” (Randewich, 2008) and “Emerging 
Market-Assets Smacked Down by Wall Street Ructions” (Versiani, 2008) led investors to 
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believe that emerging economies like Mexico were more vulnerable to financial conditions in the 
United States than the conditions warranted. Overall, the prevailing negative sentiment about 
Mexico was enough to make investors forget that Mexico was in a stronger economic position 
than it had been in former currency crises, despite the fact that country had provisions in place to 
reduce its exposure to currency risk.  
In the span of a month, Mexico’s peso lost nearly 25 percent of its value and continued to 
decline well into the first quarter of 2009 (Banco de México, “Foreign Exchange Market 
(Exchange Rates)”). With the decline, mainstream media became progressively more negative, 
leading to a December 2008 Forbes cover story titled “Mexico: The Next Disaster,” focusing on 
the country’s struggles with unemployment, poverty, corruption and increasing drug-related 
violence (Bogan et al., 2008). To an outsider looking in, Mexico appeared to be in a state of self-
destruction. The reinforcing cycle of fear and flight meant that the value of the peso continued to 
fall well into March 2009, even as the Mexican government implemented emergency currency 
swap lines and austerity measures to combat investor pessimism. 
Methodology 
Mexico provides just one example of the influence that media sentiment, information 
technology and investor behavior can have over an emerging country’s currency and domestic 
economy. Given that this influence is largely beyond the policy influence of the emerging 
economy’s government, new strategies become necessary to combat the domestic consequences 
of misinformation and external pessimism. Before strategies can be developed however, there 
has to be an understanding of how situations of herd behavior can arise, and the effects 
information cascades can have on an economy if the cascade is not “broken” with the 
introduction of positive information.  
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This thesis analyzes historical foreign exchange trading data for the Mexican peso and 
Reuters headlines and tweets to demonstrate correlations between market sentiment and the 
value of the peso. These correlations reveal probable instances of information cascades, based on 
the price movement of the asset and the ambiguous information available in the market during 
periods of heightened uncertainty. By identifying the conditions for information cascades, this 
thesis is then able to show how significant cascades might create real financial problems within 
an economy – problems which could then trigger major financial recessions like the one 
experienced in Mexico in the early part of 2009. 
The data were derived from two sources: the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
Group and Thompson Reuters. These two companies were chosen for both their extensive data 
archives and for their fundamental ties to the markets for foreign exchange. The following 
provides a brief overview of each company and the data that was chosen for this analysis. 
CME Group  
CME Group (formerly known as the two separate companies CBOT and CME) was the 
world’s first exchange for futures contracts – agreements between two parties to purchase a pre-
determined quantity and quality of a good for a certain price on a specified date in the future. 
Unlike stocks, futures contracts only existed if two parties agreed to trade; the only limit to the 
number of contracts was the number of people willing to trade. These contracts became very 
popular in the 1800s in the trade of commodities like grain, so CBOT created a market for their 
trade in 1848, and standardized the contracts in 1865 (CME Group, “Timeline of CME 
Achievements”). This effectively created a “market price” for commodities like grain, providing 
suppliers (farmers) a guaranteed price contract for their future crops, while also providing buyers 
(i.e. bakers) a way to lock in a price for the goods they were going to need in the future. 
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Throughout the 1900s, the exchange expanded to include the trade of futures contracts in 
other commodities like meat, soybeans and livestock, while after the 1970s, the exchange 
featured futures in precious metals, mortgages, currencies and stocks (ibid). By the end of the 
1990s, CME launched the first electronic platform for the trade of futures contracts, making it 
possible to place trades without physically being at the exchange. Between 2005 and 2006, CME 
and CBOT merged into CME group, while simultaneously partnering with Reuters to create the 
first ever over-the-counter global market for foreign exchange futures (ibid and Thomson 
Reuters, “Company History”). Thus, by the 2008 global financial crisis, traders were making 
electronic trades in futures contracts for the Mexican peso, utilizing a platform designed by both 
CME Group and the Reuters financial information service. 
CME Group has since kept an archive of all the futures contracts initiated and completed 
for the Mexican peso through its exchange. The company provides the raw data from these 
historical trades at a discounted fee for academic purposes, but does not provide or endorse any 
analysis of the data. The organization and analysis of the data for this thesis is strictly my own.  
I utilized three months of historical futures data for the Mexican peso: September 2008 – 
when the global crisis began with the Lehman Brother bankruptcy; December 2008 – when the 
United States government bailed out the top three US auto manufacturers who had extensive 
operations in Mexico, and when the pessimism about Mexico reached its highest point; and 
March 2008 – the month the price of the peso reached its lowest point and began to appreciate 
once more. After an initial analysis, I narrowed my focus to the month of September, when 
market uncertainty was at its highest and there was still hope that an all-out global recession 
could be avoided.   
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Within the data for the month of September, I utilized the floor closing prices of each 
day. These prices represented the “settlement price” or the price at which futures contracts are 
adjusted to equal the market price of the asset for that day. According to Shmidt (1985), a futures 
contract is settled through a process called “marking to market” where the difference between the 
market value and the contract value is paid in cash by the loser to the winner (p. 50). For 
example, a contract is made when a buyer and a seller both agree to a set price for a specified 
quantity at a future date; no money or product is exchanged in the making of this agreement, so 
the present “settlement price” is zero. But if the day after the contract is created the market price 
for the asset decreases by $1 per unit of the asset, the buyer “loses” because he or she has agreed 
to pay a higher price per unit, while the seller “wins” because he or she agreed to sell at a higher 
price than what the market currently will allow. The contract is “settled” at the end of the day 
when the buyer pays the seller the $1 per unit, making the remaining price to be paid in the 
future equal to the current market price (market price = future agreed-to price - $1 = settlement 
price). In the end, the closing or “settlement” price is equal to the current market rate for the 
asset. CME provides four “floor closing prices” for each day, representing futures contracts for 
three, six, nine and twelve month intervals. For simplicity, these four prices were averaged for 
this analysis. 
 The other two months of data were used to provide supplementary evidence of the 
considerable effects of a global recession on Mexico’s economy. When data were needed for the 
months not purchased from CME, I used averages of the price data collected by the Central Bank 
of Mexico and made available via the bank’s website. Overall, data from the Central Bank of 
Mexico was only utilized to determine the total losses of the peso from September 2008 to 
March 2009 in order to provide a comparative perspective. 
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Thomson Reuters 
 The data from CME Group, while insightful, cannot show the sentiment that was present 
in the markets while trades for the Mexican peso were being executed. In order to gain this 
qualitative information, I utilized Thomson Reuters as a second source of data. Though many 
other major news agencies existed and reported on the global financial crisis as it was happening, 
few had the unique ties to investment markets that Reuters possessed. 
As mentioned previously, the company Thomson Reuters (hereto referred to as Reuters) 
was developed to be an information provider for financial markets that could get investors 
critical news before any other source. Paul Reuter used carrier pigeons to transport “breaking 
news” from Paris to subscribers in London, and made significant investments in telegraph 
technology. According to the company, Reuters was the first to bring news to Europe about the 
assassination of US President Abraham Lincoln in 1865, “throwing European financial markets 
into turmoil” (Thomson Reuters, “company history”).    
Reuters has since extended its reach, increasing its ability to be the first to the market 
with breaking news by developing information technology to complement its journalists’ efforts. 
Over the company’s history, it has been a news company, a telegraph company, a publishing 
company, a broadcasting company, and – briefly – an oil company. By the 1960s, Reuters was 
leading the way in computerizing stock quotes, creating Videomaster to display stock and 
commodity prices on a video screen. By 1973, the company launched Reuter Monitor Money 
Rates Service, creating the first electronic marketplace for foreign exchange. Then, building on 
that service, Reuters launched its Monitor Dealing Service in 1981, which allowed traders to 
make trades of foreign currency over the Videomaster terminals (ibid). By the 1990s, Reuters 
offered a Financial Television Service for traders that provided live coverage of breaking news 
on trading screens, directly linking news broadcasts to trading floors. By the time Reuters 
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partnered with CME Group in 2006 in the markets for foreign exchange, the company had also 
developed products that would allow traders’ computers to “read” the news Reuters was 
publishing. This made it possible for financial companies to develop automatic trading 
algorithms that could “read” and react to news instantaneously, before human traders could 
physically execute a decision to make a trade. 
All of these technological advancements in the development of the foreign exchange 
markets and the distribution of information between investors gave Reuters a unique position as 
a member of mainstream media. While there were several media providers to choose from during 
the crisis, news from Reuters was distributed directly to investors via their trading terminals, 
screens within the exchanges, agency partners, broadcast media, internet articles, RSS feeds and 
news feeds to automatic trading algorithms. Reuters even used Twitter, a micro-blogging social 
platform that was only about two years old at the time, using three of its four accounts known to 
exist in 2008 to tweet about the crisis (personal communication with Thomson Reuters, March 
11, 2014, and tweet archives via twitter.com). The only other official news outlet known to also 
be on Twitter at the time of the recession was the Wall Street Journal (Ibid).  
In addition, Reuters was one of a few news agencies covering the crisis that viewed the 
events through a more international lens. While The Wall Street Journal and The New York 
Times covered the crisis extensively, their focus was almost exclusively on the effects of the 
crisis on US and European markets. When “emerging markets” were mentioned in articles, it was 
most often in reference to Japan, Russia and other parts of Asia. Mexico was mentioned rarely, 
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and usually only within the context of President Calderon’s new war against the drug trade.
1
 
Thus, Reuters was chosen as the main source of news content due to the company’s ties to 
financial markets, vast channels of distribution and international lens.  
Two types of data were gathered from Reuters. First, I gathered the company’s daily 
headlines from their online archives. These daily archives of the crisis contained the exact 
wording of the headlines published each day, the time they were published and the frequency 
each article was “re-surfaced” or republished on digital channels throughout the specified day. 
The headlines serve as both a storyline of crisis events as they were occurring and an archive of 
dynamics in the market sentiment during those events.  
The second type of data gathered was archived tweets from three of the four Reuters 
Twitter “handles” (accounts) in existence that published news about crisis events. These tweets 
provided supplementary, qualitative data of the news coverage and sentiment of the crisis by 
demonstrating headlines that were considered important enough to warrant a tweet. At the time 
of the crisis, Reuters was publishing anywhere from three to fifteen tweets a day via its handles. 
In contrast, Reuters published upwards of 200-500 times a day on its website, depending on the 
number of updates needed to cover breaking events. Yet, despite lacking the volume of the 
minute-by-minute updates of the website, the tweets provide a means to limit the noise of the 
headline data by narrowing the focus to the topics that were considered most important to share 
with readers that day.  
                                                 
 
1
 This was determined after extensive review of the microfilm archives of these papers in the 
University of Kansas Watson Library archives for the two weeks prior and after the bankruptcy 
of the US investment firm Lehman Brothers. 
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Together, the quantitative foreign exchange data from CME and the qualitative news data 
from Reuters construct a narrative that highlights periods during the crisis where information 
cascades were most likely occurring. When interviewing investors as they make decisions during 
a crisis period is not a feasible option, this method of inductive analysis provides a means to 
retroactively examine market trends for patterns of herd behavior. This method is based on a 
similar method Tetlock (2007) used to analyze media sentiment in relation to volatility in stock 
market prices. By acknowledging that herd behavior exists and that it can have a significant 
effect on the economic welfare of emerging economies like Mexico, it becomes possible to focus 
policy discussions on limiting a country’s exposure to this kind of risk through active reputation 
management. 
Structure 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: chapter two lays the ground work for 
understanding the assumptions investors had about Mexico, and how the country would fare in 
the 2008 financial crisis, by providing the historical context of Mexico’s previous encounters 
with global recessions. Chapter three then describes how changes in information technology 
have fundamentally changed the way information is gathered and used by traders to make 
investment decisions. Next, chapter four gives the theoretical background of the herd behavior 
concept, as well as the different environmental factors that make investors more prone to defer to 
the crowd when making decisions. Once the types of herd behavior have been defined, chapter 
five follows with an explanation of other research into the effects of market volatility, media 
sentiment and herd behavior in Mexico through a literature review. Transitioning into the data 
section, chapter six maps out the challenges and assumptions of this kind of analysis, along with 
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the hypotheses and results of the analysis. Finally, chapter seven concludes with a discussion of 
the future implications of this research’s findings for Mexico and other emerging economies.  
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Chapter 2: Crises in Mexico – A History of Currency Runs 
History provides critical perspective in understanding the underlying assumptions in the 
behaviors demonstrated by foreign investors during the 2008 financial crisis. Without this 
perspective, it would be difficult to imagine where the source of investor panic was ultimately 
rooted. Porzencanski (2009) stated that the “financial vulnerability of Latin America to the 
vagaries of international capitalism has been on all too frequent and public display” since the 
revolutions for independence in the early 1800s (p. 7). As it turns out, the rapid depreciation of 
Mexico’s peso during the first month of the global crisis was neither the first – nor the worst – 
time Mexico faced a run on its currency.  
Mexico has been acutely vulnerable to changes in the financial environment of advanced 
economies throughout its history, particularly with respect to economic changes in the United 
States. Since the 1980s, Mexico has experienced at least three recessions (not including 2008), 
two of which resulted in currency crises. The following is a brief overview of the channels 
through which financial crises are traditionally transmitted, how those channels have affected 
Mexico since the 1980s and the steps that the Mexican government has taken to reduce the 
economy’s exposure to those channels. 
Crisis Transmission Channels 
Though Mexico had strong macroeconomic fundamentals in place at the onset of the 
2008 financial crisis, the country was still subjected to a significant amount of investor 
pessimism, throwing the economy into a deep recession. According to Kingstone (2013), the 
pessimism surrounding Mexico and other Latin American countries during the 2008 crisis was 
“rooted in the long history of [these countries] relying on development models that heightened 
Latin America’s exposure to financial crises” (p. 64). In the case of Mexico, these development 
 
 
21 
 
models included a reliance on commodities in the late nineteenth century, the import substitution 
industrialization model of the 1970s and the fixed exchange rates of the 1990s. These models 
increased exposure to external financial crises via three main forms of transmission: credit, trade 
and herd/ contagion effects. 
 Credit crises are caused when there is a reduction of the supply of a currency, either 
through a “tightening” of monetary policy through a physical reduction of the money supply or a 
severe increase in the global demand for the currency, reducing the liquidity in the global 
economy. As a result, there are fewer units of the currency available for use in trade, increasing 
their overall value. While the reduction in the money supply successfully increases value of the 
affected currency, it also increases the cost of taking out loans in that currency due to higher 
interest rates, resulting in suppressed demand.  
During the 1970s, when debt in emerging economies was denominated in US dollars at 
variable interest rates, an increase in interest rates immediately magnified the burden of debt 
payments on the economy. In addition, the reduced supply of major trading currencies made it 
more difficult to maintain the necessary foreign reserves needed to protect the values of fixed 
exchange rates. Ultimately, rising costs of debt service and over-valuations of fixed currencies 
crippled emerging economies, who had no other choice but to try and reschedule debt service 
payments, and let their currencies correct to market values.  
Another means of transmitting financial crises from advanced economies to emerging 
economies is in the form of trade crises. Advanced economies like the United States and Europe 
make up a significant portion of global consumption demand for goods and services. Therefore, 
recessions in these countries can frequently “spill over” into emerging economies, especially if 
export trade is a large source of foreign exchange inflows into the emerging economy. In 
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addition, discoveries of new sources of commodities can also affect emerging economies that 
depend on commodity trade as a main source of income, since the new supply reduces the global 
market price for that commodity. Overall, the emerging markets with the least income 
diversification are most likely to be vulnerable to transmissions of financial crises through 
international trade markets. 
Finally, external financial crises can be transmitted to emerging economies through herd 
behavior and contagion effects. Though explained in detail in the next chapter, herd behavior 
occurs when information or cultural pressures induce many individuals to make the same 
behavioral decisions. In the case of emerging economies, herd behavior usually happens when 
new information about those economies leads investors to believe that investing or doing 
business in those countries has become too risky. A contagion effect occurs when pessimism 
about one economy is then applied to another, causing investors to withdraw significant funds 
from the countries perceived to have similarly structured economies. The following examines the 
historical application of these channels of crisis transmission in Mexico since the 1980s, and how 
the government addressed the economy’s vulnerabilities. 
The Mexican Debt Crisis of 1982 
During the 1970s, Mexico participated in the popular economic development strategy of 
that era, known as import substitution industrialization (ISI). The basic premise of ISI was to 
encourage domestic development by replacing the demand for imported goods with demand for 
domestic goods. To get people to make the switch, the government supported local industry by 
utilizing tariffs, subsidies and non-tariff barriers to imports in order to make domestic goods 
appear cheaper than their foreign counterparts. Tariff and tax revenues were then used to fund 
subsidies, generous employment benefits and wages, and public infrastructure projects. Finally, 
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the government manipulated the exchange rate for the peso to create better terms of trade for 
Mexican goods globally, while also ensuring that the machinery not made in Mexico but needed 
by local factories could be imported at more favorable prices. 
In addition, a significant portion of the government’s attention went into strengthening 
local industry. Yet, steps were also taken to create social programs to improve the economic 
standing of Mexico’s poor. This included transfers of resources from the wealthy classes to the 
working classes through artificially high wages and significant welfare benefits. When tariff and 
tax revenues were not enough to cover the bill, the Mexican government utilized revenues from 
the nationalized oil company that had just discovered new fields of oil reserves. In 1973, oil 
revenues were amplified when the OPEC oil embargo against countries that supported Israel 
reduced the global supply of oil and rapidly magnified the price of the remaining supply. 
Steadily increasing oil revenues created a false sense of economic security and stability. 
As a result, both the public and private sectors in Mexico began to take on more foreign-
denominated, variable interest rate debt in order to pursue increasingly ambitious growth 
strategies. This leveraging strategy – or using borrowed money to increase the returns on 
investments – worked well for Mexico throughout the 1970s, and the economy grew rapidly. ISI 
was successful during this time, giving the domestic economy the protection it needed to create 
the infrastructure for a manufactured exports-based economy. 
Yet the growth rate proved unsustainable in the long run. To counteract increasing 
inflation caused by exaggerated oil prices, industrialized nations tightened their monetary supply 
during the mid-70s, thereby increasing interest rates on borrowing. These countries also took 
steps to reduce their dependence on OPEC oil by increasing domestic production of oil products, 
reducing consumption through smaller cars, rationing existing supplies and using other fuel 
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sources. From 1979 to 1981, the combined oil consumption of the United States, Europe and 
Japan fell by 13 percent (Garvin Jr., 1981, p. 151).  And as a result, the global price of oil slowly 
began to fall. This had a three-fold effect on Mexico’s economy, exposing the country’s 
vulnerability to fluctuations in credit prices, trade volumes and changing investor sentiment. 
First the tightening of monetary policy in the United States increased the cost of 
borrowing dollars by increasing interest rates. This caused the variable interest rates on Mexico’s 
debt obligations to also rise, significantly multiplying the cost of servicing the country’s 
outstanding debt. Next, the rising global interest rates started to affect consumer spending, while 
increased unemployment rates and a lack of economic expansion hurt both consumer confidence 
and incomes. This triggered recessions in the United States and Europe, which then spilled over 
into Mexico via a lack of demand for its exports. Finally, the decline of global oil prices 
tempered the Mexican government’s ability to maintain its current rates of spending, and its 
ability to shield the domestic economy from the global recession. In order to service the foreign 
debt, the government had no choice but to continue to borrow money to meet its obligations. 
Once this cycle started, it was not long before the limitations of ISI became visible. 
While the strategy had boosted Mexico’s ability to build critical infrastructure needed to create a 
market for manufactured Mexican goods, the program did very little to permanently change the 
severe inequalities between the country’s richest and poorest populations. In addition, ISI put a 
significant strain on the financial stability of the government, making it dependent on foreign-
denominated debt. Mexican businesses long shielded behind high tariffs on imports found it 
difficult to compete in the global market. The financial stress started to create problems within 
the country, and violence broke out over increasing prices and shortages of staples. By August 
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1982, the culmination of all these factors meant that Mexico was no longer able to service its 
debt obligations, causing the government to ask for rescheduling of its debt service obligations. 
The request caught investors off-guard, and triggered a region-wide panic. Suddenly, 
investors were concerned that all emerging economies might be facing the same struggles that 
Mexico succumbed to, triggering a contagion effect as they withdrew their planned investments 
in these countries. Investor concern was legitimized when President Lopez Portillo (1974-82) 
nationalized the Mexican banking industry in an attempt to stem the run on the Mexican peso, 
signaling that foreign investor profits were at risk of being seized by the Mexican government. 
What started as a credit crunch and mild financial crisis quickly escalated to an all-out currency 
crisis as investors dumped their pesos in favor of the more stable US dollar. 
When President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-88) took office, he attempted to get 
the economy under control by implementing severe austerity measures to reduce the debt. 
According to Foster (2009), foreign banks, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank –who all owned portions of Mexico’s debt – demanded specific actions from de la 
Madrid before any more money would be given to the floundering economy. This included the 
IMF conditionality of devaluing the peso and cutting public spending by one-third, “[lifting] 
price controls on thousands of commodities (tortillas increased 40 percent in price, bread 100 
percent), and depleting the resources of his predecessor’s rural development program by 
targeting federal funds on increasing export production rather than domestic food stuffs” (p. 
214). Yet, even as the economy slowly staggered towards a recovery, two earthquakes beset the 
country in 1985. In what became known as the worst natural disasters in the country’s modern 
history, the earthquakes devastated central Mexico, resulting in and estimated 7,000 – 20,000 
deaths and 100,000 people stranded without homes (Foster, 2009, p. 215). The grief and anger 
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over the high death toll, paired with the government’s unpopular austerity measures and delayed 
rescue response, undermined the public’s confidence in the political system. Political upheaval 
ultimately made economic reform very difficult to implement, and the 1980s became known as 
Mexico’s lost decade of growth. 
The 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis and the Tequila Effect 
As the lost decade drew to a close, President Carlos Salinas was elected to office. 
Continuing the highly controversial policies of his predecessor, he implemented sweeping 
economic reforms that he believed would get the Mexican economy back on track. President 
Salinas’ policies resulted in a significant liberalization of Mexico’s domestic economy. He 
privatized hundreds of state-owned enterprises, liberalized foreign investment laws, deregulated 
the financial services sector and implemented across-the-board reductions in tariffs and non-
tariff barriers to trade. In June 1990, he proposed the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) to President George H. Bush, which was ratified in January 1994. 
To ease investors’ fears of currency over-valuation and subsequent currency risk, the 
Salinas administration also implemented a graduated, fixed exchange rate policy (or “crawling 
peg”). In what Crandall, Paz and Roett (2005) described as “the linchpin” of President Salinas’ 
macroeconomic plan (p. 69), the “crawling peg” allowed for the peso to gradually depreciate 
daily against the US dollar by a specified amount. This policy eliminated exchange rate 
variability, making it easier for businesses to determine the exchange rate for profits made by 
investments in Mexico. This ultimately facilitated foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country, 
helping stimulate growth in Mexico’s economy. 
In 1994, NAFTA was launched and Mexico began to experience the economic benefits of 
increased trade with its two North American partners. During this time, President Ernesto Zedillo 
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Ponce de Léon was elected into office, and Mexico was once again struggling with the effects of 
a fixed exchange rate. The exchange rate put in place during the Salinas administration held the 
peso at artificially high rates, and prevented it from depreciating even as Mexican reserves of US 
dollars dwindled.  As a result, Mexico began to struggle with a significant and unsustainable 
current account deficit.  
In an attempt to address the dwindling reserves, the Zedillo administration announced a 
devaluation of the peso by 15 percent. Unfortunately, this sparked massive herd behavior as 
investors took the devaluation to mean that Mexico was facing economic hardship. According to 
Crandall, et al. (2005), “in the 48 hours between the announced devaluation and the forced 
devaluation of the peso, Mexico’s foreign reserves dropped by $4 billion […] investors sold 
pesos in droves and the nominal price of the peso almost immediately plunged from three pesos 
per dollar to six per dollar” (p. 69).  
As Mexico sought to stem the panic in its own economy in 1995, the peso crisis created a 
contagion effect that spread throughout Latin America and some parts of Asia in what became 
known as the “Tequila Effect.” According to Peter Kingstone (2013), 
“Macroeconomic imbalances – even modest ones – led investors to conclude that the 
government could not maintain the value of the currency, triggering a run. Runs on the 
currency quickly turned into stampedes as foreign and domestic investors fled. In most 
cases, a contagion effect occurred as investors retreated from emerging markets in 
general. The ensuing social consequences, such as profound deepening of poverty, were 
devastating” (p. 67). 
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The flight from emerging market assets significantly affected the economies of Argentina, 
Brazil, India, Pakistan, Turkey and Venezuela (World Bank, 1997), shaking investors’ 
confidence in emerging markets as a whole. 
President Zedillo’s administration spent most of its term trying to dig Mexico back out of 
economic hardship. He abandoned the “crawling peg” exchange rate since the treasury no longer 
had the reserves to maintain a fixed value for the peso. This initially caused the peso to devalue 
by more than 50 percent in the first six months of the crisis (Villarreal, 2010, p. 4), but 
eventually the exchange rate leveled out to a rate that was significantly lower than the fixed 
rates. Crandall, et al. (2005) noted “the Zedillo administration’s move to a floating-exchange-rate 
system cured one major headache of the Mexican authorities—devaluation […] central bank 
authorities no longer feared a disruptive currency crisis provoked by massive capital flight” 
(p.72).  
The administration also made concerted effort to reduce Mexico’s exposure to crises via 
credit channels by working to reduce the country’s overall debt. As oil prices started to increase 
at the end of the 1990s, Zedillo used the extra revenue to pay off $3 billion dollars of debt owed 
to the IMF, three years ahead of schedule (Crandall, et al., 2005). By 2001, the economy was 
stable with significantly reduced debt and near-balanced fiscal budget. Yet the economy still 
faced stagnated growth caused by the trade recession that followed the burst of the US dot com 
bubble. 
While the floating exchange rate had helped to prevent future situations of capital flight 
and helped the economy grow swiftly through favorable terms of export trade, it also had 
devastating effects on Mexico’s poorest populations. According to Villarreal (2010), “the peso 
devaluation resulted in a decline in real income, hurting the poorest segments of the population 
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and also the newly emerging middle class” (p. 5). Since the effects of the recession were so 
severe on the domestic economy, the government decided to take steps to restructure the 
economy in order to lessen the impact of future crises on the poorest sectors of the population.  
To do this, the government had to create conditions in which it could move quickly to 
address rapidly changing economic conditions. With the support of the IMF and the United 
States government, Mexico set up emergency financial support packages, which would allow the 
Mexican government to withdraw up to $50 billion in loans from both the IMF and the US in a 
time of crisis (Villarreal, 2010, p. 5). By the year 2000, the Zedillo administration’s efforts to 
stabilize the economy were paying off; growth that year reached 6.6 percent just as the Fox 
administration took over (Ibid). 
Mexico’s Economy 2000 - 2008 – Learning from the Past 
At the turn of the twenty-first century the Mexican government pursued policies aimed at 
liberalizing trade, while simultaneously trying to ensure the stability of the peso. These policies 
consisted of monetary and fiscal controls to keep inflation low, and free trade agreements to 
reduce Mexico’s dependence on the United States.  
After the debt crisis of 1982 and the peso crisis of 1994-95, the Mexican government had 
implemented sweeping monetary and fiscal reforms. These reforms included measures to reduce 
the public deficit through a new balanced budget rule, requiring the government to limit yearly 
spending to the amount of revenue
2
 brought in each year. According to the Bank of Mexico, the 
Mexican government had reduced its public debt to 15.8 percent of GDP and it was running a 
budget surplus of 0.1 percent of GDP by 2006 (Annual Report, 2010, p. 71). 
                                                 
 
2
 Government revenues in Mexico consist of a combination of tax and oil revenues. 
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In addition, the government had also adopted a floating exchange rate in order to avoid 
the situations that created the peso crisis of 1994.  According to Sidaoui, Ramos-Francia, and 
Cuadra, this allowed the currency to shift in value based on the market demand for pesos, with 
the added benefit of significantly reducing inflation in Mexico (p. 281). The floating exchange 
rate also had the effect of stimulating Mexico’s industrial sector by making Mexican goods 
appear cheaper in the global market. Finally, this stimulus was compounded with an increase in 
trade brought about by the implementation of NAFTA, as Mexican exports to member countries 
increased from USD$50 billion in 1994 to almost USD$250 billion in 2008 (Villarreal, 2012, p. 
16). 
After each recession Mexico emerged battered but financially stronger, helping to prepare 
the country for future instances of investor panic. The financial packages, balanced budget rule, 
floating exchange rate and reduced foreign-denominated debt were all instrumental in ensuring 
that Mexico weathered the 2008 financial crisis without inducing a currency crisis. As 
Porzecanski (2009) concluded, “[2008] may well be the first time since Latin America gained its 
independence in the early 1800s that a major economic contraction and financial calamity in the 
industrialized world has not caused a wave of currency, sovereign debt or banking crises in the 
region” (p. 5). Yet, it became apparent that Mexico was still vulnerable to negative investor 
sentiment ingrained in the minds of traders after years of repeated currency crises.  
In mid-2007, the first signs of stress in the U.S. housing market appeared. Loose credit 
and an intentional lack of government oversight resulted in an over-inflated US housing 
economy. In the months leading up to the beginning of the global financial crisis, investors were 
still confident that Mexico would remain moderately unaffected due to the sound monetary and 
fiscal policies the government put in place after the debt and peso crises of the eighties and 
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nineties. Yet when the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers was forced to declare bankruptcy, 
affecting several other financial companies around the globe, the international economy entered 
a state of panic. Investors and companies around the world pulled their money out of the markets 
because they could not be certain which companies would be affected by the investment bank’s 
collapse.  
Mainstream media narrated the effects of the week following Lehman’s failure, restating 
the market’s pessimism, but providing no more concrete information about the absolute effects 
that the failure’s fallout would have on specific assets. New methods of sharing information and 
trading assets meant that the news was shared and acted upon instantaneously, long before 
official parties had a chance to provide facts about the true state of asset values. It quickly 
became clear that the global investing environment to which Mexico sought to reduce its 
exposure had fundamentally changed, exposing the country to a new kind of crisis that had not 
existed in past crises– that of the technologically aided information cascade. 
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Chapter 3: Information Technology and Investment Behaviors 
Between the peso crisis of 1994 and the global financial crisis of 2008, the means by 
which investors gathered information about investments evolved significantly. The introduction 
of internet technologies rapidly increased both the amount of information available to investors, 
and the speed with which they could find and utilize that information. The world became 
digitally connected, facilitating information sharing on a level that made it difficult for 
governments to censor. The 2008 financial crisis was the first global recession in which news 
about Mexico’s economic vulnerabilities could be shared in seconds, rather than days, using a 
variety of digital media sources. This new level of scrutiny was not limited to emerging 
economies and had a significant impact on all of the economies involved in the global credit 
crunch. 
With its proximity to the United States, Mexico felt the brunt of that new scrutiny when 
the markets in the United States started to falter. While the investment world focused squarely on 
the US government’s actions as the Lehman Brothers investment bank faltered, the week 
following the bank’s failure had global repercussions. As illustrated fully in chapter eight, 
observers could physically watch the sentiment about Mexico and other Latin American 
economies deteriorate through digital news and social media publications that coincided with the 
dramatic drops in currency values.  While the primary source of information about these 
economies came from mainstream news sources (as in past crises), the speed at which the news 
was shared through social media and online search accelerated the impact that news had on both 
Mexico’s currency and its economy. The following examines the evolution in information 
technology prior to the 2008 crisis, and how that technology impacted the investment behaviors 
that affected the value of the Mexican peso in the onset of the global financial meltdown. 
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The Evolution of Information Technologies 
The early 2000s saw the rise of both internet and mobile technologies. Information 
consumption increased rapidly around the world as the internet and smartphones granted 
instantaneous access to any information the heart desired. In addition, the creation of search 
engines provided a means through which that information could be found efficiently, while 
social media provided a new means to store, share and even create information consumers found 
to be important. Finally, the proliferation of mobile applications allowed consumers to search, 
create, share and shop on the go, further liberalizing the flow of information – and sales 
opportunities – around the world. Together, these technologies changed the everyday behavior of 
consumers and ultimately, the behavior of investors as well. 
Technology and the Brain 
 Individual consumer behavior changed tremendously with the introduction of internet 
technology. The new technology revolutionized the way individuals were able to connect and 
share information, while also providing a wealth of information never previously aggregated on 
such a large scale for so many people to access freely. Even information written in a foreign 
language could be accessed by an audience of non-native speakers, thanks to the development of 
online translation services. Finally, the development of search engines made it easier than ever to 
find very specific sets of information, by allowing users to search for it using only a few 
keyword phrases. 
Yet, as with all rapid change, the evolution of consumer behavior to information 
technology had both its advocates and its critics. Proponents of the new technology believed it 
made society smarter by providing better access to information. Yet skeptics believed that the 
speed and amount of information people were inundated with on a daily basis were 
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overwhelming society, causing it to lose the ability to critically analyze texts due to information 
overload. 
Dan Tapscott is one of the major proponents of the digital age. In his book Grown up 
Digital (2009), Tapscott argues that advances in technology have actually made society smarter 
(p. 30). With the dawn of the Internet, more diverse information is available than ever before; a 
researcher can now take into account a more diverse set of opinions and sources then he or she 
may have previously been able to access using traditional sources (p. 44). In addition, Tapscott 
states that the amount of information available to society has made society more skeptical and 
critical of the information with which it is presented (p. 80). Thus, he surmises, people are prone 
to research even more to make sure that the information they have is correct before claiming it to 
be true.  
Tapscott also argues that due to the quickly changing nature of the Internet, people have 
become quicker to change their opinions and assumptions when new information is presented (p. 
80). If the information a person finds turns out to be incorrect, it does not take long for that 
person to discover his or her mistake and make a course-correction – usually through a quick 
Google search. The end result, Tapscott explains, is a society that is smarter and will adapt more 
quickly than ever before to changes in the information environment. 
When viewed through the lens of investing, Tapscott’s findings imply that investors are 
more likely to research their investments constantly due to the ease and speed at which 
information can be gathered. In addition, investors are more likely to be skeptical of the 
information that they find, causing them to seek out multiple sources to validate the information 
they use to make investment decisions. Finally, Tapscott’s findings imply that investors will be 
less likely to hold onto investments for long periods of time because information is constantly 
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changing. Thus, investments would be bought or sold based on the newest information available, 
rather than loyalty or a company’s past performance. Overall, in Tapscott’s world, there would 
be more volatility in stock markets, but investors would be better informed about their 
investments. 
 However, critics of Tapscott claim that the very nature by which the Internet presents 
new information and promotes multitasking is actually making society less intelligent. Due to 
time constraints and information overload, individuals may be consuming small amounts of 
information across several subjects at the cost of being able to critically analyze a few texts 
deeply for their true meaning and implications. Thus, information that sounds “good enough” 
becomes the information that people believe, regardless if it is from an expert opinion or not. 
Nicholas Carr speaks to this phenomenon in his book The Shallows: What the Internet Is 
Doing to Our Brains (2010). Carr’s research discusses how the very means people gather 
information can shape the way they process that information. Claiming to have been born of an 
analog world, Carr describes the time in which he was able to sit down and analyze the text for 
extended periods of time. “Once I was a scuba diver in a sea of words,” he recalls. “Now I zip 
along the surface like a guy on a Jet Ski” (p. 7). Carr also notes that this phenomenon is 
becoming so prevalent that sitting down to read a book has become a foreign experience to some 
members of younger generations: 
For some people, the very idea of reading a book has come to seem old-fashion, and 
maybe even a little silly – like sewing your own shirts or butchering your own meat. “I 
don’t read books,” says Joe O’Shea, a former president of the student body at Florida 
State University and a 2008 recipient of a Rhodes Scholarship. “I go to Google, and I can 
absorb relevant information quickly.” O’Shea, a philosophy major, doesn’t see any 
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reason to plow through chapters of text when it takes but a minute or two to cherry-pick 
the pertinent passages using Google Book Search. “Sitting down and going through a 
book from cover to cover doesn’t make sense,” he says. “It’s not a good use of my time, 
as I can get all the information I need faster through the Web.” As soon as you learn to be 
“a skilled hunter” online, he argues, books become superfluous (p. 8-9). 
This attitude has found its way into the investing world as well. The very premise of 
using search engines, social media and even automatic trading algorithms to “cherry-pick the 
pertinent passages” of breaking news stories means that investors are able to act on new 
information faster, without actually reading the text thoroughly. This has major implications for 
herd behavior, since the very means by which information is aggregated and used has the 
potential to induce herd behavior. In particular, as the global community transitions to an age in 
which people acquire information from internet sources and search engines like Google, the way 
they are presented “relevant” search results has the potential to frame the way they perceive the 
credibility of the information listed on the results page. 
Google: Another Kind of Herd-Inducing Algorithm 
Like social media, online search has come to play an intricate role in the sharing of 
information. As the Rhoades Scholar demonstrated, the initial search for new information in the 
21
st
 century usually begins with Google. As of 2013, Google is the most popular search engine in 
North America. According to comScore (2013), the leading authority of internet technology 
analytics, people living in the United States typed 12.8 billion search inquiries Google’s search 
bar in August 2013 alone. Those searches represented 66.9 percent of the full 19.1 billion search 
queries made in the United States in that month. Microsoft’s Bing was the second-most used 
search engine at 17.9 percent (3.4 billion) of the total search market queries (Ibid). 
 
 
37 
 
Google gained popularity as a search engine for the way it organized and made 
information “searchable.” An individual can find nearly anything by putting a simple query into 
the search bar, which Google uses to organize access to the pages that are most “relevant” to that 
person. Google displays information on multiple results pages, ranking information by both 
relevance and popularity. According to the company, the Google algorithm “rely[s] on more than 
200 unique signals or ‘clues’ that make it possible to guess what you might really be looking for” 
(2012, “Inside search”). These signals include: keywords within the content of a webpage; the 
timeliness of the content; the geographical region of the user; the amount of clicks the page 
receives when it shows up on the search results page; and the “bounce back” rate, or length of 
time a user spends on a page before “bouncing” to a different page.  
The Google algorithm also uses a ranking mechanism call PageRank, designed by the 
company to determine the relative “appropriateness” and credibility of a webpage for a specified 
keyword. Though the nature of this program is constantly changing, part of its analysis of 
websites takes into account the number of “link-backs” to a web page by other websites for 
certain keywords (Brin and Page, 1997). Each “link-back” acts as a vote of confidence from 
other websites for specific keywords, much like citing sources in a research paper for particular 
topics.  Combined with all of the other 200-plus signals, Google’s algorithm uses a complex 
weighting algorithm to determine the “rank” of a web page for each keyword or keyword phrase 
entered into its search bar. 
The resulting rank determines what order search results appear to users when a query is 
entered. However, this method of ranking can lead to information cascades when people using 
the same keywords to search for information on Google are presented with similarly ranked sets 
of information. According to information technology researcher Sounman Hong (2012), ranking 
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is important to the creation of information cascades because “highly ranked information is made 
more visible to users, assuring an even higher probability of getting online clicks” (p. 70). The 
higher “click-through” rate (clicks to the page) then reinforces the “credibility” ranking given to 
the page by the PageRank algorithm, causing it to continue to present that same information for 
the specified keyword set. 
This means at a very basic level, consumers have been “trained” to believe that the most 
relevant sources of information will appear on the first couple of pages of search results, making 
it likely that they will cite the same resources when looking up information. This behavior is well 
documented. According to a recent study by the digital advertising network Chitika (2013), the 
very first search result in the “organic” or un-paid search listing receives on average one-third of 
all click-throughs, with the second result receiving a mere 17.6 percent (“The Value of Google 
Result Positioning”). 
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When considering the multitude of resources offered for a single search (over 25 million 
results for the search in Figure 4), the fact that the first three results receive over half of users’ 
attention is a testament to the search engine’s potential to unwittingly create information 
cascades. Unless the user is unusually persistent, Chitika’s findings note that most users never 
move past the first page of results. Overall, the very first page of search results receives 91.5 
percent of all clicks, while the second and third pages receive 4.8 and 1.1 percent respectively 
(Ibid). Thus, despite the great wealth of knowledge made available to consumers through the 
internet, people still tend to focus on only a handful of information sources in order to avoid 
information overload. 
 
Figure 3 The Percentage of Overall Google Traffic Allocation by Results Page 
When bombarded with so much information, so many different sources and so little time 
to verify the truth, the tendency to herd becomes stronger as people look to the group to 
determine which source is the most credible. Thus, the role of social media and primary media 
Figure 2 Percentage of Clicks Organic Search Results Receive in Relation to Rank on Results Page 
[Source: Screen grab of Google search results page] 
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sources becomes more important as people seek to limit the noise of the Internet to sources that 
they deem credible. If a group or culture as a whole decides that one or two particular sources are 
highly credible, then other people will follow and hold that source be credible as well. 
Seeking Faster Information 
Prior to the dawn of digital information technology, traditional means of gathering 
investment information took considerable time and analysis. From Reuters’ pigeon and telegraph 
service, to the telephone and television, investors have constantly sought out faster sources of 
important, “market-moving” information that they could act on before anyone else. If the 
information was good enough and found quickly enough, investors could purchase or sell assets 
before the market price moved to reflect the value of the information change, allowing them to 
make a profit on the difference. This competition and drive to be first to the market with news is 
the reason why the United States established laws against insider trading. After all, using 
information not available to anyone else has the potential to cause asset prices to move so 
substantially from their original values that other investors in the market could be financially 
ruined before the information becomes available to them.  
Yet even within the confines of regulation, information traders – or those investors who 
seek to make profits by being first to the market with new information – have constantly sought 
to create advantages for themselves at the expense of their competitors. The internet not only 
provided new sources of information that were previously difficult to obtain in the analog era; it 
also provided investors the ability to search for specific keywords to find the snippets of 
information most important to them, without taking the time to read whole books or articles.  The 
three most important information technology developments created during this time were 
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machine “readable” newswires, the social media platform Twitter, and automatic trading 
algorithms. 
Reuters led the way in digitizing mainstream media news, creating both a dot com news 
hub and a newswire specifically for investors. In 2006, Reuters released two products (names 
unknown) that allowed machines to “read” Reuters headlines digitally for the first time, paving 
the way for automatic trading algorithms (Thomson Reuters, “Company History”). As a result, 
investors no longer had to search the internet for breaking news; it was delivered straight to their 
trading hubs for analysis. 
Around the same time Reuters was digitizing news, Twitter was quickly becoming one of 
the most commonly used social media platforms for investment information.  Founded in March 
of 2006, Twitter functioned as a “micro-blogging” site that allowed people to share updates in 
140 characters or less (Twitter, “About”). By the fall of 2007, major news media companies like 
Reuters were using the social platform to share breaking news headlines with their followers, 
often accompanying the headline with a link to the full article. 
Louis Lovas, director of solutions at OneMarketData, noted in an e-FOREX magazine 
article that the idea of trading based on non-traditional information found using social media is 
“not new by any means”(Szalay, 2014). While some trading companies who viewed social media 
with skepticism blocked its use on company computers, tech-savvy information traders 
increasingly used social media via smartphones as an additional pipeline of trending news.  
A market research study by MarketWired, a leading social media analytics, market 
research, and high frequency trading algorithm firm, confirmed the growing trend of social 
media use among investors. The study titled, “The Future of Investing and the Great Social 
Shift” consisted of survey responses from 120 US-based stockbrokers, financial and market 
 
 
42 
 
analysts, financial advisors, individual traders and fund managers. MarketWired found 40 
percent of all the respondents admitted, “that they were using social media to find [investment] 
information” (Levine, 2013). Among the millennial generation – respondent 40 years old and 
younger – 60 percent stated that they frequently used social media to research investments, with 
53 percent of them stating that they believed the information they found on those channels to be 
credible (Ibid). It was not long before companies combined Twitter and the digital newswires to 
build algorithms that capitalized on all the fast new information. 
Shortly after Twitter started gaining traction in 2007, the company OneMarketData 
created its flagship data analysis tool OneTick that it later combined with a market data platform 
from a company called Wombat. Together, these two companies were able to provide a trading 
algorithm program to both aggregate and analyze real-time data from online sources like Reuters 
digital newswire and social media. These algorithms were able to execute automatic trades with 
“low-latency,” or human unperceivable delays between finding and acting on the data (The 
Trade, 2007). According to the Securities Technology Monitor (2008), This tool gathered from 
sources of data including Reuters, the Interactive Data Corporation and Wombat, allowing 
customers “to collect data from equities, fixed-income, foreign exchange and commodities 
markets” for use in their own high frequency trading algorithms. 
HFT Algorithm 
 Since 2007, companies have been incorporating automatic trading algorithms designed 
to “beat” the markets by searching “credible” pipelines of news such as Reuters or The 
Associated Press for market-moving information, via both digital newswires and Twitter 
streams. Once that information has been found, the program will buy or sell stocks automatically 
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within milliseconds of analyzing the data. This rapid method of trading has come to be known as 
“high-frequency trading,” or HFT. 
HFT was a well-established trading strategy by the time the 2008 financial crisis started 
to spread globally. This became evident in 2009, when investment firms Goldman Sachs and 
UBS (Union Bank of Switzerland) both brought charges against former employees for allegedly 
stealing proprietary computer code keys to their HFT algorithms. In an article by Katherine 
Heires in 2009, those HTF algorithms were “the most tactical and strategic weapons on Wall 
Street” at the time, comprising “many millions of dollars of profits per year.” According to the 
article, “algorithms account[ed] for over 25% of all shares traded by the buyside [in 2009]” while 
“73% of US equity trading volume [was] attributed to the activities of high-frequency trading 
firms” (2009, “Code Green”). In other words, 73 percent of the trade volume in the US market 
alone during the crisis could be attributed to computers acting on information found online, 
rather than trades initiated by discerning human beings.  
For information traders who make their living off of “seeking alpha” or market-changing 
information, algorithms quickly became the only way to keep up with competitors and to turn a 
profit. “In today’s lighting [sic] fast markets,” e-FOREX journalist Szalay states, “microseconds 
can make a difference, and minutes are a long time” (2014). Yet, for all their profit-generating 
uses, algorithms have inherent downsides.  
The volume of trades initiated by HFT algorithms acting on negative news articles about 
the price of the Mexican peso could have contributed to an over-exaggerated run against the 
value of the peso before “experts” with better information could act. With HFTs making up 
nearly a quarter of the market, the resulting impact HFT sales of pesos would have had on the 
peso’s market price could have had the effect of making people doubt their own information 
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about the real economic conditions in Mexico enough to join the flight away from the peso. This 
would have made the fall in the asset’s value more severe. The continuing fall would have 
created more market pessimism about the peso, even if the true reasons for the fall in value were 
unclear. Overall, the shear 73 percent of volume attributed to HFT algorithms could have created 
enough of a market movement to initiate an information cascade against the peso. This 
ultimately could have caused the peso’s value to fall further than it would have if individuals had 
acted solely on their own information and HFTs were not part of the market. 
In addition, HFTs could have added to the overall uncertainty in the markets during the 
first week of the global financial crisis by increasing the volatility in the prices of assets it 
automatically chose to buy and sell based on media sentiment. Thus, in the event that negative 
information was published about the economy, HFTs could have initiated a “flash crash” that 
would have negatively affected that economy. While archives of the time during the first week of 
the crisis make it incredibly difficult to determine if flash crashes were a significant problem 
during the 2008 crisis, the following provides concrete evidence that these phenomenon do exist, 
and the potential impacts they can have on the market.  
Flash Crashes 
To prevent losses, each algorithm is designed to move on the same information that 
investors believe their competitors will use to initiate trades, in addition to unique but verified 
proprietary information.  This creates systematic opportunities for herd behavior, when all the 
algorithms initiate similar actions on the same basic information. If the information is negative, 
algorithms have the potential to create “flash crashes” in the market, where affected assets lose a 
significant portion of their market value in mere seconds based on information that was gathered 
from digital sources. Worse, if the information from sources deemed credible turns out to be 
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wrong, flash crashes have the potential to significantly impact the value of otherwise healthy 
assets before anyone realizes a mistake has been made. 
This is exactly what happened on April 23, 2013. At 1:07 p.m. EST, The Associated 
Press (AP) Twitter account published a tweet stating, “Breaking: Two Explosions in the White 
House and Barack Obama is injured.” This tweet was sent out to the account’s nearly two 
million Twitter followers and shared by these followers over three thousand times.  In the two 
minutes that followed the publication of the 71-character message, both the S&P and Dow Jones 
dropped precipitously, losing over $136 billion dollars in revenue (Keller, 2013). According to 
Reuters, even stock and bond futures contracts were affected (Selyukh, 2013). This message had 
triggered the automated selling provisions of HFT algorithms, and their programs were causing 
the market to crash. Consisting of half of the allowable message characters, rarely had so few 
words caused such a major impact on the stock markets. 
Yet the information in the tweet was not true. Suspicions were raised almost immediately 
when journalism industry experts started to point out the writing-style inconsistencies in the 
tweet. They pointed out small details, such as the use of the word “and” instead of the correct 
AP-style comma, in addition to the sentence-case “Breaking” instead of AP’s usual all-caps 
“BREAKING.” However, given that this tweet was published just over a week after the Boston 
Marathon bombing, it took several minutes for the markets to register that the tweet was fake. 
Once the algorithms picked up news that the tweet was not real, the markets rebounded almost as 
quickly as they had fallen.  
Twenty minutes after the tweet was publish, The Associated Press released a statement 
that its Twitter account had been hacked, and that the company had removed the false tweet. 
Later it was revealed that the both the main account @AP and the company’s @AP_Mobile had 
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been hacked by group known as the Syrian Electronic Army, who had used a sophisticated 
phishing email to glean the account’s password credentials. According to The Telegraph, the 
hack was one of many cyber-attacks that week “in a string targeting international media 
organisations [sic], including the New York Times and The Wall Street Journal” (2013). 
 
  
 
  
 
Figure 1 The Effect of the Fake AP Tweet on the S&P 500 [Source: Thomson Reuters]  
Figure 2 Official Syrian Electronic Army Twitter Account Claiming Responsibility 
for AP Twitter Hack (account has been suspended) 
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As mentioned, the markets recovered quickly from this “flash crash” because it soon 
became obvious that information was not coming from a credible source. Yet the markets still 
moved, indicating the limitations of the trading algorithms that could not make the distinction in 
the subtle writing differences between the real and fake tweets. The April 2013 flash crash also 
exposed how reactive the markets had become to information shared via social media and other 
online sources due to these HFT algorithms.  
Ultimately, the April 2013 flash crash ended up being harmless because it happened 
during a period of relatively calm economic times and was in reaction to “news” that was clearly 
false. Given that no other news outlet published the same news, even ill-informed investors were 
not induced to sell off assets in a panic. This meant that markets recovered quickly with no 
permanent lasting effects.  
Figure 3 Official AP Acknowledgement of Hack [Source: Screen 
grab from AP Corporate Communications Twitter page] 
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However, the actions of these algorithms, combined with negative media sentiment and 
the drive to be first to the market with news, could have triggered large amounts of market 
volatility during the first week of the 2008 financial crisis. The uncertainty created by the 
collapse of the Lehman Brother’s investment bank, and the subsequent near-failure of other 
major financial firms created significant market pessimism – a sentiment that was reflected in 
mainstream media.  As articles about the potential, but unproven, vulnerabilities of companies 
and economies were published by global media sources, the reactions of HFT algorithms 
reacting to that news could have initiated flash crashes in the values of those assets. The fact that 
flashes exist means they could have been a contributing influence in the initial, near-
instantaneous flight away from the Mexican peso after the announcement of Lehman’s 
bankruptcy. 
Technology During the 2008 Crisis 
All these advances in information technology prior to the 2008 financial crisis changed 
the way investors could react to negative events as they were unfolding. Not only could investors 
quickly find information about the crisis and how it affected their portfolios – the information 
was pushed to them via digital newswires and social media alerts. They no longer had to make a 
phone call to initiate a trade based on the new information; they could just go online or execute a 
trade from their mobile device using an investing app. Thus when a significant amount of 
uncertainty entered the market the day that Lehman declared bankruptcy, investors were able to 
respond instantaneously, using the latest breaking news to make investment decisions.  
In addition, large investment companies were also able to react to the negative sentiment 
in the news faster than anyone else through the use of automatic trading algorithms. This meant 
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that the stock markets reacted within hours of Lehman’s bankruptcy filing, rather than days, 
increasing the sense of urgency and uncertainty present in the markets.  
For reasons explained in detail in chapter five, this sudden volatility and uncertainty in 
the markets caused many investors to become risk adverse. Thus, any asset perceived as risky 
was liquidated (sold) in an attempt to build up cash reserves in preparation for hard economic 
times ahead. These sales happened quickly and were often scheduled via the internet even when 
markets were closed. As a result, markets “froze” or ceased to work, since few people were 
willing to invest without a guarantee that an investment would survive the crisis. This meant that 
businesses were unable to get the short-term credit lines they relied on as a source of cash flow to 
pay bills and employees. Cash – in US dollars to be specific – became both the most demanded 
asset and the hardest asset to come by. Eventually, when the dollars could not be sourced within 
US markets, investors began to sell their foreign assets to build up cash reserves. 
Given Mexico’s past history with global crises/ recessions, the peso was perceived to be a 
more risky asset, prompting investors to trade the peso for US dollars even though the country 
had nothing to do with the crisis unfolding in the United States. In addition, pesos were easy to 
exchange for US dollars because there was a large enough market of people willing to buy pesos 
to facilitate the trades, unlike smaller Latin American countries such as Costa Rica. As the value 
of the peso fell, mainstream media published articles about the devaluation through online 
channels, rapidly increasing the perceived negativity surrounding the peso. Ultimately, volatility 
caused by pessimistic investors and HFT algorithms reacting to media sentiment could have 
triggered a herd effect against the Mexican peso, contributing its 25 percent devaluation in the 
first month of the crisis. The devaluation and subsequent credit crunch caused Mexico’s 
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domestic economy to fall into a deep recession, from which it did not begin to recover until late 
March of 2009. 
Mexico ultimately became the most affected Latin American economy during the crisis. 
The devaluation of the currency was longer, and the recession deeper than any Central or South 
American country. Yet, the country’s biggest vulnerabilities to the United States were trade 
related; Mexico had already taken steps to reduce economic vulnerabilities through currency 
swap lines, flexible exchange rates, reduced foreign-denominated debt and balanced budget 
rules. In fact, the Mexican government had been strengthening all of the country’s 
macroeconomic fundamentals since the currency crises of the 1980s and 90s. Yet for all the 
effort put into building up Mexico’s economy, the country still suffered even more than the 
United States – the country that started the crisis. 
Ultimately, the crisis Mexico experienced through the first quarter of 2009 could be 
largely attributed to the behavior of foreign investors who were beyond the control of Mexican 
economic policies. The coordinated behavior of these investors forced the Mexican government 
into a defensive position; it had to implement policies and rescue plans to calm the fears of these 
investors in order to slow the flight of capital leaving the country. And while the government 
was ultimately successful, the effects of this herd-like behavior were still profound. To better 
explain why external herd behavior created so many issues for the Mexican economy during the 
crisis, the next chapter provides the theoretical background of herd behavior study. In addition, it 
explains the cultural and incentive structures that can induce rational investors to participate in 
herd behavior during times of uncertainty that will ultimately make them financially worse off. 
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Chapter 4: The Theoretical Background of Herd Behavior and Information Cascades 
Information cascades and contagion effects are both part of the broader theory of herd 
behavior. As explained previously, the phrase “herd behavior” is a general descriptor used to 
explain situations in which the decisions of individuals combine to produce coordinated group 
behavior. Actions that are labeled as herd behavior come in a variety of forms and can be either 
the result of an efficient distribution of information in the market (positive) or a means by which 
individuals make less than optimal decisions (negative). Most often used in the negative sense, 
herd behavior, or the mimicking of others, is a phrase that has come to represent market failures 
caused by the lack of time and/or will of individuals to gather all the necessary information 
needed to make a well-informed decision. This chapter discusses the history of herd behavior, 
the specific types of herd behavior and how they relate to behaviors observed during the 2008 
financial crisis. 
A History of Herd Behavior Observations 
Herd behavior is primarily a psychological concept that has become an important aspect 
in the study of financial market behavior. In 1869, Scottish journalist Charles Mackay presented 
the concept in in his book Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds stating, 
“ men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that they go mad in herds, while they 
only recover their senses slowly, and one by one” (p. 18). Herd behavior is often used to describe 
situations in which people make seemingly irrational decisions when caught up in the fervor of 
“groupthink.” 
Yet herd behavior is not always irrational. Economist John Maynard Keynes (1936) 
proposed that both professional and personal investors chose investments like one might choose 
a contestant of a newspaper beauty contest. Instead of picking the candidate that they personally 
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believed to be the most beautiful, individuals would choose the candidate that they thought 
would win– the candidate that they believe other people would find most attractive (p. 21). Thus 
in Keynes analogy, investors “seeking alpha” or information-based profits would pick 
investment assets that they thought would be affected the most by short-term market sentiment, 
rather than choosing assets they thought would perform best over the long run. Thus, investors 
make the rational decision to forfeit possible future profits for profits that can be made in the 
present. 
Herd behavior is also not limited to investing. This phenomenon has been used to explain 
why people in the same geographic regions share similarities in cultures and fashions 
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992) and why some software programs on the internet are adopted faster 
than others (Duan et al., 2009). However, its implications for investing have profound cross-
border effects. The theory of herd behavior provides a possible example for why, in highly 
diversified and globalized markets, fund managers will still try to mimic the portfolio mixes of 
their competitors in order to find the “right” balance between risk and profit (Calvo and 
Mendoza, 1996). Rather than capitalize on the diverse offerings that globalization provides, fund 
managers are more like to herd rather take the time to research assets not being bought or sold by 
their competitors. These behaviors are rational when the cost of gathering all the necessary 
information outweighs the possible added benefits of making a more informed investment. 
American moralist and philosopher Eric Hoffer states (1955), “when people are free to do as they 
please, they usually imitate each other” (p. 21). Ultimately, since information can be 
communicated through behavior, individuals who herd are simply exercising a means of learning 
from group norms in order to pick the least risky course of action. 
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Spurious Versus Intentional Herding 
There are two major general classifications of herd behavior as defined by Bikhchandani 
and Sharma (2001), two of the original developers of the theory of information cascades. First, 
there is “spurious” herding, a type of coincidental herding, and second, “intentional” herding. 
Spurious herding, which is also referred to as efficient herding, happens when information is 
distributed efficiently throughout the market once introduced. If the information is “market-
changing,” and investors adjust their strategies and actions to reflect it for the most optimal 
results, then the resulting shift in market prices indicates spurious herding. 
This kind of herding is commonplace, and is what Adam Smith was describing when 
writing about the “invisible hand” of the market.  Bazán and Montes (2011) also found this kind 
of herd behavior when studying Mexican stock markets. Their research showed that when 
recently released macroeconomic data about the United States’ economy differed greatly from 
what investors expected, the Mexican stock markets would react significantly in what appeared 
to be coordinated actions.  
Ultimately they found that Mexican investors were participating in spurious herding 
when they adjusted their investment decisions simultaneously to realign their strategies to 
account for the new market conditions, without collaborating with other investors. Given 
Mexico’s trading ties with the United States, the coordinated movements of the Mexican stock 
markets were rational reactions to macroeconomic events that could have a significant impact for 
the Mexican domestic economy. Thus, even though the market moved as a herd, it was merely a 
coincidental aggregation of reactions to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Inversely, intentional herding – or inefficient herding – occurs when individuals choose 
to ignore their own information. Instead, they may choose to take a different course of action in 
favor of using the information that other investors were using when they made their purchase 
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decisions. In this case, the first movers in the market become critically important because they 
influence the behaviors of decision makers that come after them. the first mover is a prominent 
member of the market, like the major investment bank Goldman Sachs, there is an increased 
incentive to “learn” from the first mover’s behavior, imitating that behavior in an attempt to 
capture the same “alpha” or information-based profits. As more investors choose to disregard 
their own information in favor of seeking the same alpha as competitors, the resulting market 
shift is called a “cascade.” 
Three Types of Intentional Herding 
There are three major types of intentional herding that are considered common among 
portfolio managers and financial investors. These are compensational, reputational and 
informational herding.  
Compensational Herding 
Compensational herding occurs when the compensation of professional investors is 
determined by a benchmark that compares the individual’s performance to the performance of a 
pre-defined group. Given that the individual’s bonuses may depend upon their performance 
compared to the benchmark, that individual is likely to mimic the actions of the benchmark 
group to ensure that his or her results are not inferior to the overall group performance. While 
this strategy does prevent the individual from performing below the benchmark, it also prevents 
the individual from acting on his or her own information and strategies that might have resulted 
in larger gains for the company. Also known as the “agency problem,” intentional 
compensational herding is inefficient because the most profitable opportunities are not pursued 
due to the threat they pose to possible future individual compensation. 
 
 
 
55 
 
Reputational Herding 
 Likewise, reputational herd behaviors in the form of peer-pressure, word of mouth 
recommendations, and social sharing are called “network effects” as they rely on networks for 
the distribution of information. This type of herd behavior is most commonly found in the 
conforming pressures of individual investing firms and online social networks where peers judge 
personal lifestyles and decisions.  
These network effects can cause “reputation cascades” – instances where individuals 
choose to ignore their own preferences and adopt the behaviors of prominent members of the 
group because they fear that deviating from group norms will damage their personal or 
professional reputation. Keynes (1936) notes, “worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for 
reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally” (pp. 157-58). This means that 
individuals are more likely to have their actions be subject to intense scrutiny by their peers if 
they fail in an innovative way, than if they fail taking the same strategy as everyone else. 
Therefore the risk of deviating from the herd becomes much higher, especially if risky behavior 
is rewarded with job termination. 
Reputational herding perpetuates when it becomes a rational means of self-preservation. 
Sharfstein and Stein (1990) describe this situation as the “sharing-the-blame effect,” as observed 
in the 1987 US stock market crash: 
There are a number of settings in which this kind of herd behavior might have important 
implications, One example is the stock market, for which the following explanation of the 
pre-October 1987 bull market is often repeated: The consensus among professional 
money managers was that price levels were too high – the market was, in their opinion, 
more likely to go down rather than up. However, few money managers were eager to sell 
their equity holdings. If the market did continue to go up, they were afraid of being 
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perceived as lone fools for missing out on the ride. On the other hand, in the more likely 
event of a market decline, there would be comfort in numbers – how bad could they look 
if everybody else had suffered the same fate? (p. 465) 
Fast-forward to the 2007 housing bubble in the United States: once again reputational 
cascades gained attention as one possible explanation for the seemingly irrational behavior of 
investors buying risky derivatives known as mortgage-backed securities (MBS). When asked to 
explain why his investment-banking firm continued to participate in the market for MBSs despite 
their risk, the then-CEO of Citigroup Charles Prince gave the following explanation of the 
pressures the firm faced: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be 
complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still 
dancing” (Nakamoto and Wighton, 2007).  
With this creative metaphor, Prince was trying to convey that the company’s customers 
wanted Citigroup to continue to purchase MBSs because they thought they were good 
moneymaking investments. If his company refused to purchase the derivatives, its customers 
would take their money to another company. On the other hand, if Citigroup’s customers 
suddenly decided that MBSs were too risky, they would also take their cash (what he refers to as 
liquidity) out of the company because its portfolio was full with MBSs purchased at the 
customers’ insistence. Prince understood that in the long run his company was in trouble if the 
sentiment about MBSs ever turned negative, but he could not hedge against the risk (stop 
dancing) without angering his customers. In the end, the inefficient reputational cascade cost 
Prince his job and the company its financial stability. 
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Informational Herding 
 Finally, the third type of intentional herding is informational herding. Informational 
herding occurs among unconnected groups of people. This type of herding is the most difficult to 
empirically separate from the other types and measure, yet it is one of the most important forms 
of herd behavior to understand. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) propose that individuals 
participate in this type of herd behavior assume that investors who took action before them have 
better information and demonstrate said information through their actions (p. 280).  
Unlike instances of network effects, information cascades occur because groups of 
unconnected individuals either do not have the time or the access to the information that others in 
the group have available to them. Therefore, participants in information cascades do not have the 
opportunity to validate the information that others used to take action against their own personal 
information to see who has the best information. If the market movements are in striking contrast 
to the actions an individual would have taken given their own information, uncertainty becomes 
an issue, creating doubt in the individual’s mind. The individual must then choose whether or not 
to ignore the market movements to stick to his or her own information, or ignore the information 
he or she has in order to take the same action as everyone else. 
Time constraints play a big role in whether or not individuals choose to herd. Banerjee 
(1992) notes that if individuals are given time to observe all the actions of the market, and other 
investors are doing the same, then there is enough time to gather the necessary information to 
make the most optimal decision. However, if the opportunity costs of waiting (i.e. the loss of 
investment returns) increase with each moment a decision is not made, investors may decide to 
herd to prevent short-term losses. Banerjee (2001) writes, “To see the intuition behind this result, 
note that it is the marginal and not the absolute value of information that matters in the decision 
of whether or not to wait” (p. 815). In a time crunch, investors may decide that the marginal 
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“vote of confidence” given to an asset when several people buy into it is “good enough” 
information about the asset’s quality to justify purchasing it.  
When time constraints and large amounts of uncertainty are an issue, fear can make the 
tendency to herd even stronger. According to neuro-economist Paul Zak, “our brains are really 
wired to accept the group opinion of the world […] when you see millions of people in the 
market essentially freaking out, that spills over into your brain and you get this impulse to do 
what everyone else is doing” (As quoted in Fox, 2008). Ultimately when uncertainty, fear and 
time constraints combine, it makes it difficult to maintain individuality. People end up joining 
the information cascade when they would have been better off relying on their own information. 
Thus, the assumption that first movers have larger quantities of good quality information 
that allows them to take swift action is the main reason why informational herding can be so 
inefficient. By choosing to follow the behaviors of previous, unknown investors, a person is 
assuming (A) those investors have better information; (B) they made the correct choice that 
optimizes returns and reduces risk; and (C) the market concurs with those assumptions because 
“everyone else” is making the same decision.  
However, as Banerjee (1992) notes in his “Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” making the 
decision to follow the actions of others at the expense of one’s own knowledge further robs the 
market of useful information, making each subsequent decision less valuable to the next decision 
maker. Eventually an “information cascade” is triggered, where “we find that in equilibrium the 
reduction of informativeness [sic] may be so severe that in an ex ante welfare sense society may 
actually be better off by constraining some of the people to use only their own information” 
(Banerjee, 1992, p. 797). Simply put, in a market where everyone mimics each other, no real 
information is transmitted through their purchasing actions. Consequently, if the first few 
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individuals to make the investment decision were working from incorrect information (or no 
information at all), the resulting cascade can cause everyone to also make the wrong decision. 
This not only causes each investor to become worse off, but may also cause massive 
consequences in markets as large quantities of resources are misallocated. 
Information cascades tend to be short-term in nature because of the constant introduction 
of new information that overrules the assumptions made about other investors’ behaviors. As 
such, Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) note that behavior that causes information cascades “is 
fragile, in that it may break easily with the arrival of a little new information; and it is 
idiosyncratic, in that random events combined with the choices of the first few players determine 
the type of behavior on which individuals herd” (p. 284). Since the introduction of new 
information causes individuals to make decisions that break away from the information cascade, 
others observing that behavior might infer that new information has entered the market and 
initiate a cascade in the opposite direction.  
If the information cascade is triggered by automatic trading algorithms, the cascade can 
break in a matter of minutes, depending on how fast new information enters the market. In high 
frequency trading (HFT) the phenomenon where a cascade is triggered but breaks a few minutes 
later is called a “flash crash” – aptly named for the sudden crash in asset prices that the cascade 
causes.  In the end, the presence of information cascades and intentional herding have the 
potential to increase volatility in markets as individuals, companies and algorithms representing 
large sums of assets swiftly reallocate their wealth among “trending” investments. 
Ultimately, some sort of “information” introduced to the market triggers information 
cascades. This information can be a change in macroeconomic fundamentals (i.e. the economy is 
experiencing a recession), but it can also be a general feeling or sentiment portrayed in the 
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markets. In periods of high uncertainty, where there is very little information about why the 
market is reacting the way it is or how that reaction will affect investments, sentiment plays a 
much bigger role. The sentiment conveyed via mainstream and social media can change how 
investors perceive the future prospects of their investments, either making them more hopeful or 
more pessimistic and risk adverse. The following explains research about the effects of media 
sentiment on market volatility, and how sentiment from foreign media sources has affected 
Mexico’s economy in the past. 
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Chapter 5: Studies of Volatility, Media Sentiment and Self-Fulfilling Panics in Mexico 
There has been extensive research on the link between media coverage and financial 
market movements since the gyrations of US stock markets in the late 1980s. The stock market 
crash of 1987 challenged some of the assumptions of the efficient markets theory of economics 
presented by American economist Eugene Fama (1970), with particular respect to asset prices 
and the information that they convey. The basic premise of Fama’s theory states that market 
prices reflect all the information available at that specific point in time. Prices are “efficient” 
when they instantaneously reflect new information that has become available to the public. Thus, 
if new negative information about an asset is released in the market, the price of the asset will 
fall immediately in response, reflecting the new fundamental value of the asset. This theory 
assumes absolute objectivity, that investors will only make decisions based on the information 
available in the market, regardless of the sentiment in which it is presented. This leads to the 
hypothesis that asset prices in markets only move when new information is presented, and 
represent an objective re-adjustment of market expectations.  
Cutler, Poterba and Summers of the Nation Bureau of Economic Research were some of 
the first researchers to empirically test the efficient markets hypothesis in their paper “What 
Moves Stock Prices?” (1989). Their research came in the wake of the 1987 US stock market 
crash, a period of economic history that could not be explained by a fundamental shock to the 
market. There were no major non-economic events, such as elections or foreign conflicts, and 
there were no new changes in macroeconomic fundamentals, such as inflation or interest rates; 
yet, the market still crashed.  
In response, Cutler et al. sought to understand if the 1987 crash was unique, or if most 
market movements were at best loosely linked fundamental shocks. Using highly structured 
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vector autoregressive models for seven types of macroeconomic fundamentals
3
 and a less 
structured comparison of return regressions to historical data and new events, they studied the 
overall stock market’s performance from 1926 to 1985. They then used an analysis of 
contemporaneous market movements to study the robustness of their analysis of the historical 
market movements. In doing so, they found that shocks or changes in macroeconomic 
fundamentals only accounted for eleven percent of the stock market movements during the same 
time period (p. 7). When using a less structured analysis, comparing the regressions to historical 
events, Cutler et al. found that fundamental shocks still only accounted for 29 percent of the 
market volatility (p. 10). At best, major news events could explain market movements only 50 
percent of the time, but the authors cautioned that this number could be an overstatement due to 
the limitations of the less-structured analysis (ibid). 
Cutler et al. then compared the top 50 one-day gains in the S&P index to the New York 
Times account for the fundamental changes that explain those gains. They found that in most of 
the days, it was very difficult to attribute a fundamental change as the reason for the gain, noting 
that on several of those days the New York Times even reported that there was no known cause 
for the market movement (13). Overall, they found that publically available information about 
fundamental shocks could, on average, only account for a third of the market volatility present 
on any given day in financial markets. That meant that two-thirds of the volatility present in 
markets was not the result of new, tangible facts, but rather something else.  
                                                 
 
3
 Cutler et al. examined seven major macroeconomic variables for their study: real 
dividends, industrial production, monetary supply, long-term interest rates for corporate bonds, 
short-term interest rates for Treasury bills, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation rate and 
stock market volatility. 
 
 
63 
 
Economists Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993) explained through their research that 
this two-thirds phenomenon could be attributed to what they called “non-information traders” or 
investors that chose to trade assets for reasons other than changes in market fundamentals. 
Though their research did not explain why these “non-information traders” chose to trade, they 
were able to provide a direct correlation of their actions to the unexplained two-thirds volatility 
isolated by Cutler et al (1989). 
Tetlock (2007) sought to explain why these “non-information” traders decided to trade, 
even when the fundamental value and facts about an asset had not changed. He found that in 
times of uncertainty, these traders became more risk adverse or pessimistic about the short-term 
future prospects of an asset, prompting them to sell to “rational arbitrators” at a discounted price. 
He also found that these actions were based more on sentiment – how the investor felt about the 
asset – than a tangible change in the asset’s value, and that the sentiment often reflected the 
sentiment of the recent news publications. Realizing that news media played a significant role in 
the decisions of these traders, he redefined “non-information traders” as “noise traders” – 
investors that make decisions based on the “noise” or information published by mainstream 
media. 
 Using a quantitative content analysis program called General Inquirer (GI), he was able 
to prove a direct link between the sentiment of financial news media publications (i.e. The Wall 
Street Journal) and volatility trends in the market. He found that the link was particularly strong 
when the use of pessimistic vocabulary in media articles affected market movements in what he 
coined as the “pessimism factor.” “High levels of media pessimism robustly predict downward 
pressure of market prices,” he writes, “followed by a reversion to fundamentals” (p. 1140). What 
Tetlock describes as a downward pressure in prices followed by a return to the original prices is 
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the very definition of an information cascade. Uncertainty and pessimism present in news media 
causes noise investors to become more risk adverse, which then causes them to seek out liquidity 
by selling what they perceive to be risky assets until the uncertainty is resolved. This belief is 
based on the sentiment they hear from media sources and the actions of other investors that they 
observe in the markets. Once there is a better understanding of what is going on in the market 
and how it will affect other assets, these noise investors begin to purchase assets again, causing 
the prices to stabilize and return to fundamental values. 
The interconnectedness of markets through globalization facilitates noise traders’ desires 
to move their assets from one country to another during times of uncertainty. Latin American 
economists Calvo and Mendoza present a case study of Mexico’s balance of payments problems 
during the 1995 tequila crisis, proposing that fund managers had an incentive to switch from 
buying to selling Mexican investments at the slightest negative rumor because it was easy. The 
globalized economy presented them with so many other options that it did not make sense to 
invest a lot of time in researching the rumors’ validity; they could just move their money to other 
countries that were perceived to be less risky. As a result, Calvo and Mendoza (1996) stated, 
“outcomes in which the equilibrium response to news is a self-fulfilling panic become plausible, 
and the behavior of policy-makers becomes as important as their policies (i.e. a poorly-handled 
devaluation can have disastrous effects)” (p. 14). Self-fulfilling prophecies of crisis are 
particularly plausible in periods of high uncertainty, such as the uncertainty that a global 
financial crisis creates. 
In addition, Calvo and Mendoza (1996) propose that the increase in costs of gathering 
thorough information on so many different investment options also increases the incentives to 
mimic the strategic behavior of other investors by trying to copy their portfolio mixes – a 
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strategy known as “strategic complementary.” An example of this exists when a company tries to 
mimic the portfolio mix of Berkshire Hathaway, the company that Warren Buffet partially owns 
and invests in, in an attempt to make the same kinds of profitable returns that the company has 
historically made. Whenever Berkshire Hathaway makes a decision to buy or sell a stock, the 
company participating in strategic complementary would also buy or sell the same stocks. 
On an international scale, strategic complementarities among currency investors means 
that each group of investors with highly diversified portfolios are likely mimicking each other’s 
behaviors in order to maintain the same portfolio mix of currencies as everyone else. While this 
ensures the portfolios are engaging in less risk according to the perceived information in the 
market (the behavior of others), this exposes each country to the very real and detrimental risk of 
capital flight as large amounts of available capital are moved from “risky” countries to “less 
risky” countries during times of uncertainty. Thus the sources of information that these investors 
rely on to make their investment decisions become incredibly important to the overall wellbeing 
of the economies in which these groups invest.  
Yet, Professor Alfontes Ayala (2011) of the University of San Marcos in Peru notes that 
strategic complementaries reduce the total amount of information about the countries available in 
the market, making it possible for rumors to become market-moving events: 
La globalización reduce los incentivos para recolectar información específica del país e 
incrementa la probabilidad que los fondos que se preocupan de su performance relativo 
elija el mismo portafolio. Consecuentemente pequeños rumores pueden inducir un 
comportamiento de manada y mover la economía a una crisis de balanza de pagos       
(p. 13). 
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Globalization reduces the incentives to collect country-specific information and increases 
the probability that funds preoccupied with their own relative performance will choose 
the same portfolio. Consequently, small rumors can induce herd behavior and move the 
economy into a balance of payments crisis. [L. Vachalek translation]. 
If investors fail to take the time to become experts in the countries in which they are investing, 
they will be unable to identify inaccuracies in the information being presented as “breaking” 
news. Instead, they will be more likely to be swayed by media sentiment, simply moving their 
money out the countries perceived to be the most negatively affected.  
Thus, the dangers of information cascades for emerging economies like Mexico are two-
fold. First, since information cascades represent periods where trades are made based on 
sentiment rather than fact, the outcome of the cascade is largely beyond the control of the 
emerging economy’s government. While the government can manage the macroeconomic 
fundamentals of the domestic economy in the form of debt levels, inflation targets and 
regulation, Cutler et al. (1989) convincingly argued that those actions would only affect a third 
of market price volatility. The other two-thirds of the volatility would be based on investors’ 
perceptions of the economy’s ability to withstand periods of uncertainty or crisis, a perception 
according to Tetlock (2007) that would also be largely influenced by media sentiment.  
For Mexico, this meant that during periods of uncertainty such as the 2008 global 
financial crisis, investors would base their assumptions on the outcomes of similar crises in the 
country’s past, in addition to any sentiment presented by the media. As demonstrated in the 
historical background section of this paper, Mexico’s economy traditionally suffered severe 
currency crises after global recessions, resulting in a pessimistic outlook on the country’s ability 
to withstand future crises. Thus, in a time of uncertainty, the default media sentiment about 
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Mexico would be negative, despite the steps the government had taken to strengthen the 
country’s macroeconomic fundamentals and reduce the domestic economy’s exposure to external 
crises. 
Second, an information cascade could create balance of payment problems for Mexico as 
traders withdraw investment capital and dump their currency holdings. If the cascade is severe 
enough for a long enough period of time, the sentiment-based herding could trigger a real 
financial crisis within the country due to a lack of available credit and currency devaluation. The 
fear of a crisis in Mexico then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, causing the “rational” non-
noise traders to join the herd in reducing their Mexican holdings because a crisis actually starts to 
develop. Latin American economists Chang and Velasco explained this scenario in their paper 
“Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: A Canonical Model” (1998): 
If a bad shock brings the economy to the region where runs are possible, the harmful 
effects of the bad shock will be multiplied when, in addition, a run actually takes place. It 
may be a plausible conjecture that such scenario would arise because (loosely speaking) 
the bad shock makes depositors and bank creditors pessimistic, in the sense of expecting 
a run when one is feasible. Such a story, we argued at the outset, is reminiscent of events 
in Mexico in 1994 and East Asia in 1997, in which moderate shocks (higher world 
interest rates in the Mexican case, dollar appreciation and slow Japanese grow in Asia’s) 
triggered major financial crises coupled with large contractions in economic activity  
(p. 31). 
This means that during the 2008 financial crisis, a period of time in which Mexico was 
vulnerable to a trade recession through its heavy dependence on the US for export trade, 
pessimistic sentiment could have made the expected recession more severe. As the data analysis 
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section will show, an information cascade early on in the crisis could have actually caused 
Mexico to experience economic contractions sooner and more severely than it might have in a 
simple trade recession. By creating enough of a run on the peso and other Mexican assets, an 
information cascade could trigger a deeper financial crisis. 
The next section analyzes media and foreign exchange trading data to identify this kind 
of cascade-like behavior against the Mexican peso in the 2008 global financial crisis. By first 
identifying the conditions in which information cascades are most likely to be present, this thesis 
then examines if the severe economic contraction Mexico experienced in the first two quarters of 
the crisis could indeed be the side effect of investor sentiment rather than poor macroeconomic 
fundamentals. 
 
 
69 
 
Chapter 6: Challenges, Assumptions, Data, Hypotheses and Observations 
Challenges and Assumptions 
There were several challenges in isolating possible instances of information cascades in 
the market for the Mexican peso during the 2008 crisis. The first challenge presented in the study 
of foreign exchange was the issue of periodicity, or lack of natural breaks in the market data. 
Since markets for foreign exchange never actually open or close, comparing “days” of foreign 
exchange closing prices becomes difficult. To address this issue, this paper utilized data of peso 
transactions from the CME Group (Chicago Mercantile Exchange), which functions as a foreign 
exchange market in the United States. Data of trades completed through this exchange provide a 
small snapshot of the overall market conditions that mimics the total peso trades completed in 
the world. Using data from this exchange also created periodicity since the exchange only 
operates during normal business hours, closing on evenings, weekends and US holidays. In 
utilizing this data, it became possible to compare “days” of trading with daily headline news. 
The second challenge to finding information cascades was creating distinctions between 
spurious and intentional herding. It is nearly impossible to separate the two empirically without 
exhaustively interviewing market participants as they were making decisions during the crisis. 
Therefore, this paper used a specific set of criteria and assumptions to isolate periods of time 
where there was a high probability intentional herding was taking place. 
To determine if any information cascades occurred during the 2008 financial crisis, data 
on periods of extreme asset price movements were measured against the following criteria and 
assumptions. First, because information cascades are assumed to occur during periods of 
uncertainty where the true value of an asset is unclear, the drop in the asset – or in this case, the 
price of the peso – had to be both severe and unexpected. This meant that the economic and 
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political conditions of Mexico had to appear relatively stable and unchanged, ensuring that the 
cause of the price drop was purely external in nature (i.e. outside of the control of the Mexican 
government).  
Next, assuming information cascades occur quickly before information about actual 
conditions becomes available, the price drop of the peso had to occur within hours of the change 
in market sentiment. This drop indicated that the sale of the peso was reactionary, rather than 
rationally based on facts about the real effects of the event on Mexico’s economy. This also 
ensured periods of gradual, informed readjustments in the price of the peso were excluded, 
thereby increasing the probability that the behavior observed in the market was intentional 
herding rather than spurious herding.  
Third, it was assumed that media plays a critical role in perpetuating an information 
cascade by providing timely, but ambiguous updates about the price drop that publically 
recognizes the fear surrounding the asset. These published observations about the price drop 
serve to convince other investors in the market to join the herd out of fear. Fear causes these 
once rational investors to believe that the “first movers” may have had better information, as 
indicated by their decision to sell the asset. This causes those investors to ignore their own 
information and to sell the asset, despite the fact that the true value of the asset has not appeared 
to change.  
In order to perpetuate the intentional herd behavior, information about the price drop had 
to come from a reputable source that was both timely in its publications and widely accessible to 
decision makers through multiple information channels. For the purpose of this research, 
headlines and tweets from Reuters were utilized to provide a narrative of the crisis as it 
happened, in addition to providing the sentiment of the markets. Reuters has traditionally filled 
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the role as the go-to resource for breaking financial news, and it maintains its reputation of being 
the timeliest source of investment information by providing news through multiple platforms. 
These platforms include print publications through traditional media partners and online 
publications via its website, blog and social media feeds.  
Reuters was also chosen as the main source of news about market sentiment during the 
crisis because of its direct ties to investment markets. In 2005, the company partnered with CME 
Group to link “sell-side traders in the interbank [foreign exchange] market to CME’s eFX 
market,” thereby creating Reuters Trading for Foreign Exchange (Thomson Reuters, “Company 
History”). The following year, Reuters led the way in automated trading by creating products to 
help machines “read” news headlines published through a digital newswire (ibid). Therefore, 
automated trading algorithms that used Reuters products for the purpose of foreign exchange 
trades in CME markets would have “read” Reuters headlines published during the crisis and 
factored that information into trading decisions.  
Finally, according to a Pew Research Journalism Project (2009) on the financial crisis, 
Reuters acted as the top online news source for information about the crisis. According to the 
study, “About two-thirds of Reuters’ leading news coverage from February till early July [2009] 
was economy-related, more than double the level in the [online] media overall” (p. 6). In 
addition, Reuters was the only major source of mainstream financial media broadcasting its news 
through Twitter during the crisis, with the exception of the more US-focused Wall Street Journal. 
Thus, individual investors looking online for quick information about the crisis would have 
found most of the available information through Reuters.com and three of the four active Reuters 
Twitter handles. Occasionally, other major finance news sources were also included in the data 
tables as pertinent articles were found.  
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This data was then compared to CME Globex foreign exchange data for the Mexican 
peso. Three separate months of exchange data was used during the analysis: September 2008 – 
the beginning of the global crisis, December 2008 – when the sentiment about Mexico’s future 
prospects were most negative, and March 2009 – when the devaluation of the peso ceased. The 
data from September and December were used for herd behavior analysis, while the data from 
March 2009 was used as a benchmark to show the full effect of the depreciation. This data was 
then compared to the sentiment of the Reuters headlines to test the following hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 
The development of the hypotheses began with a general observation of the overall 
market trends for the Mexican peso and the US stock exchanges. As previously noted, it was 
observed that the Mexican peso lost nearly 25 percent of its value from September 22, 2008 to 
October 16, 2008. Thus, the initial hypothesis was that the sharp drop in the price for the peso 
could indicate the presence of an information cascade triggered by negative sentiment in 
mainstream media. Since the visible drops in the price of the peso correlated with major events 
during the crisis – such as the bailout of the government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the bailout of the US auto industry – these 
events were selected to be analyzed for further evidences of information cascades.  
The second hypothesis was that negative media sentiment would be closely correlated 
with downward pressure on the price of the peso. Once an information cascade was identified in 
hypothesis #1, daily Reuters headlines mentioning the event, the crisis, the effects on Latin 
America in general, and mentions of the Mexican peso specifically were gathered and analyzed 
for sentiment. This sentiment was then compared to the foreign exchange data from CME Group 
to determine if there were any observable correlations in the peso’s volatility. 
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Observations  
The first step in the analysis was isolating periods or events during the crisis that 
mimicked information cascades. As stated in the hypotheses, three major events were selected 
for their potential to create conditions for herd behavior in the market for the peso. These events 
were: (1) the week after the rescue of the government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac; (2) the entire week after the bankruptcy of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers; and 
(3) the week after the “Big Three” US automakers received bailout funds from the US 
government.  
The first event – the rescue of Fannie and Freddie – was a turning point in the US credit 
crunch. The fact that the US government had to take control of these two entities because of the 
overwhelming risk that mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) had added to their balance sheets 
meant that similar assets held by other investment companies in the market were more risky than 
previously perceived. This was the first major introduction of uncertainty to the market that 
affected markets outside of the United States, and caused investors to become more pessimistic 
about the value of the assets on the books of other investment firms.  
The bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment bank was chosen as the second event 
because it represented the official transition of the US credit crunch into a worldwide financial 
meltdown. The bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 signaled to investors that the US government 
was no longer going to guarantee the rescue of companies that made poor investing decisions, 
causing investors to become significantly more risk adverse. As a result of the uncertainty, 
investors began to build up cash reserves, while also demanding that companies they invested in 
do the same. 
Finally, the bailout of US automakers was chosen as the last event for three reasons. First, 
the fact that the companies needed help demonstrated how uncertain the markets had become, 
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making it very difficult for these companies to secure credit lines and sell cars. Second, all of the 
“Big Three” automakers had significant factory operations in Mexico, meaning if they failed, 
Mexico’s domestic economy would be directly impacted. Finally, this event was chosen because 
it took place in December 2008, right when pessimism surrounding Mexico was at its highest 
with a Forbes cover story calling the country “The Next Disaster” (Bogan et al, 2008). 
Hypothesis #1: Identifying Information Cascades 
To determine if the market reactions to these three events could qualify as information 
cascades, they were measured against the three assumptions about information cascades laid out 
in chapter seven: (1) the devaluation of the peso had to be severe and unexpected; (2) the 
devaluation had to happen within hours or a day of when the major event took place; and (3) the 
media had to provide timely, but ambiguous, updates about the devaluation using pessimistic 
vocabulary to convey the risk aversion of the market. 
The Government Takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
September 2008 represented the transition of the US credit crunch into a global financial 
crisis. This was also the month that Mexico began to feel the effects of the uncertainty in the 
financial markets of its Northern neighbor.  
Prior to September, the outlook for Mexico was very positive. According to the OECD 
(2011), public debt was low at approximately 30 percent of GDP, while growth was above the 
OECD average (pgs. 153-154). The peso had also appreciated to historical highs of roughly 10 
pesos to every 1 US dollar (Banco de México, n.d.). Despite the on-going drug war, the economy 
was growing, and Mexico was seen as an excellent investment for companies looking to 
capitalize on the free trade provisions of NAFTA. Thus, any devaluation of the peso at this point 
in time would have been sudden and unexpected, meeting the criteria of assumption one.  
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On September 7, 2008, the US government announced the takeover of the government-
sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, organizations that had played an integral role in 
the creation and sale of MBSs. There had been significant uncertainty in the market about 
whether the organizations would be rescued and what kind of risk their failure posed to other 
financial institutions. Their rescue by the government prevented all-out panic, but it also caused 
investors to take a hard look at the investment banks that had made billion-dollar profits from the 
trade of MBSs.  
The growing uncertainty tightened credit lines, as investors became more risk adverse. 
Should the markets falter, cash was going to be the most important asset, causing traders to 
divest what they perceived to be their more risky assets. This caused the peso to devalue slightly 
from September 8
th
 to September 11
th
, losing a total of 1.5 percent of its value in three days 
(CME data, “Average Floor Close Prices” Table). According to Reuters (2008a), “the peso 
retreated as investors questioned whether the bailout would provide much more than a temporary 
floor under battered financial markets.” A concern about the vulnerability of Mexico’s export 
trade to a recession in the US was cited as the biggest reason for the depreciation, which 
eventually steadied after the 11
th
, appreciating a slight 0.2 percent.  
Overall, the depreciation of the Mexican peso after the takeover of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac was unexpected and somewhat severe. Given that prior to the crisis the peso gained 
or lost value at an average of one percent a month, a loss of 1.5 percent in three days was 
significant. In addition, this devaluation of the peso was reactive in nature, occurring within the 
first three days after the takeover of the government-sponsored entities (GSEs).  
Yet, while mainstream media provided updates about both the takeover and the peso’s 
fluctuations as they were happening, the articles were varied in their sentiment, trending more 
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towards neutrality. Only one pessimistic Reuters article was published in the three-day 
depreciation of the peso after the takeover, stating “Mexico’s peso hit by US credit worries, 
stocks flat” and linking the decline to Lehman Brothers rather than the government sponsored 
entities (O’Boyle, 2008). While it is possible that the devaluation the Mexican peso experienced 
after the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could have been the result of risk-adverse 
traders’ herd behavior, it is not clear if that behavior was linked directly to that specific event.  
Instead, it appeared that the biggest concerns affecting the peso’s value were coming 
from news about Lehman Brothers’ struggle to secure credit, which was creating uncertainty in 
financial markets. Thus, the devaluation of the peso from September 8
th
 through 11
th
 could have 
served as a warning to the Mexican government that conditions were prime for an information 
cascade against the peso, giving the government time to prepare strategies to head off negative 
sentiment if conditions worsened. However, since the government was not monitoring media 
channels for sentiment about its economy, Mexico had no way to be proactive in protecting the 
domestic economy from an external sentiment-based information cascade.  
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy 
The failure of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers was one of the most important 
events of the 2008 global financial crisis. As mentioned previously, the bankruptcy of this 
company on Monday, September 15, 2008, signaled to the markets that the US government was 
no longer guaranteeing with taxpayer-funded bailouts that firms would survive their decisions to 
take on too much risk. Instead, companies with large amounts of risk in their portfolio would 
have to find someone in the private market willing to provide them the credit they needed to 
calm growing fears of insolvency. 
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The announcement of the bankruptcy sent a shock through the markets. The failure of 
Lehman meant that the government really was not going to bailout troubled companies, meaning 
that any number of companies exposed to Lehman or the toxic assets could be the next 
companies to fail. A commercial trade recession was no longer the central fear of investors. 
Instead, investors feared the impending financial meltdown, and the very real chance that they 
could lose everything. In consequence, investors throughout global markets became severely risk 
adverse and began to divest what they perceived to be risky assets. The markets plummeted, 
taking with them the value of the peso.  
 
 
 
 
At this point, nothing had changed in Mexico or its economy. The peso had been stable 
leading up to Lehman’s bankruptcy, and the country had already re-adjusted its expectations for 
next-quarter growth to take into account the worsening recession in the United States. Therefore, 
Week After Lehman Files for 
Bankruptcy; AIG Seeks Rescue 
Figure 4 Average Closing Prices of the Mexican Peso in September 2008 
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the two percent devaluation of the peso from Monday to Tuesday was both severe and 
unexpected given the country’s lack of connections to the toxic assets creating chaos in this US 
markets. In addition, the peso lost the first percent of its value within four hours of Lehman 
Brothers filing for bankruptcy, indicating that the drop was more reactionary than rational.  
Finally, as will be demonstrated, Reuters published a new update about the unfolding 
crisis every twenty minutes that day, in addition to other news that was occurring around the 
world. These updates were “breaking” in nature, providing a description of the sentiment and 
shock of the markets rather than hard facts about why markets were falling so fast. At least seven 
of those updates directly addressed the effects of the panic on the Mexican peso and Latin 
American economies in general. Of the three events initially chosen for closer analysis, the 
failure of Lehman Brothers, followed by the subsequent panic in financial markets, provided the 
best representation of an information cascade during the crisis.  
US Automaker Bailout 
Upon closer analysis, the bailout of the US automakers in December 2008 was 
immediately ruled out as a possible information cascade for the following reasons. First, by the 
time the automakers were provided bailout funds on December 19, 2008, the Mexican peso had 
already devalued from an average of $0.09445 USD/MX September 2, to an average of 
$0.072875, for a total loss of 22.8 percent (CME data, “Average Floor Close Prices” Table). This 
meant that investors had had three months to adjust their expectations to the real economic 
conditions within Mexico, conditions that had started to deteriorate significantly into a severe 
recession.  
In addition, on December 4, 2008, Forbes magazine released its “Next Disaster” cover 
story on Mexico detailing the country’s economic struggles with the global crisis and the rising 
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violence of the drug war along its Northern border (Bogan et al). The article was not breaking 
news, but a researched piece provided an explanation for the deteriorating peso, and conveying 
resignation rather than fear or uncertainty about the economy’s outlook. This meant that anyone 
who reacted to the news was simply adjusting his or her expectations to the facts presented – a 
form of rational behavior. Any coordinated market movements at this point would have been, by 
definition, spurious herding. 
Finally, at this point, the markets were no longer reacting wildly to news about Mexico’s 
economic struggles or significantly devalued currency. Instead, the peso fluctuated within a 
range between $0.071 to $0.073 USD/MX throughout the month until the holiday season, when 
the peso began to devalue once more (CME data, “Average Floor Close Prices” Table). 
 
 
Hypothesis #2: Correlations Between Media Sentiment and Peso Volatility 
After identifying the information cascade, the next step was to determine if media 
sentiment presented in the headlines the week after Lehman’s collapse was related to the 
Figure 5 Average Closing Prices of the Mexican Peso in December 2008 
Automaker Bailout Forbes Cover Story 
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volatility of the peso. To do this, Reuters headlines were gathered for each day of that week, 
chronicling both the events that were sparked by market uncertainty and market sentiment. The 
sentiment was then compared to the average loss or gain of the peso that day to determine if 
there was a positive correlation between media sentiment and the peso’s value. 
Monday, September 15, 2008 
This day began with Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing, the effects of which were 
swiftly chronicled by Reuters headlines and tweets, a sample of which were provided below: 
Table 1 Mainstream Media Headlines for Monday, September 15, 2008 
Time (EDT) Headlines on September 15, 2008 News Provider 
4:46 AM Lehman files for Bankruptcy Reuters 
7:32 AM Lehman collapse hits global system  Reuters 
8:24 AM Fallout from financial crisis not over -IMF chief  Reuters 
8:32 AM 
Mexico peso falls over 1 pct on US financial 
woes  
Reuters 
8:51 AM 
Mexico peso falls over 1 pct on US financial 
woes
4
 
Reuters 
12:11 PM Lehman sparks bank worries in Europe  Reuters 
12:35 PM Mexico's one-month Cetes yield dips to 8.16 pct  Reuters 
1:15 PM 
Wall Street crisis: Investors dump shares after 
Lehman collapse  
The Guardian 
1:21 PM Banks lose after Lehman collapse  Reuters 
1:30 PM Shock waves hit Wall Street  Reuters 
2:29 PM Cascades proceeds with the sale of Scierie Lemay  Reuters 
2:30 PM 
Examine the 2008 Mexico Industry & Market 
Outlook Report: Providing Data on Over...  
Reuters 
2:48 PM 
Emerging Markets-Assets smacked down by Wall 
Street ructions  
Reuters 
3:46 PM Mexico peso, stocks hit hard by U.S. credit woes  Reuters 
4:28 PM Paulson says system is sound  Reuters 
4:46 PM U.S. credit woes slam Mexico stocks, peso  Reuters 
5:48 PM AutoNation: Access to credit an issue Reuters 
 
                                                 
 
4
 Note: The repetition of a headline indicates that an article was published again after it 
was updated with new or corrected information. 
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6:25 PM 
Uncertainty Hits Wall Street After Lehman, 
Merrill Meltdown 
PBS NEWSHOUR 
6:46 PM 
Panels on Emerging and Commodity Markets to 
be Broadcast Live From the CME  
Reuters 
6:47 PM Financial crisis hits consumers  Reuters 
7:10 PM Markets plunge on financial fears  Reuters 
7:29 PM GM sees raising capital tough  Reuters 
7:46 PM Detroit reacts to Wall Street crisis  Reuters 
 
 
Figure 6 Tweet from the @Reuters Twitter Account During the First Day of the Global Crisis 
 
  
Figure 7 Similar Tweets Shared Though Reuters US Twitter Account 
 
An analysis of the verbs and nouns used in Reuters headlines provides an interesting 
perspective of the main economic events and the sentiment in the market that day. Topics 
centered on the effect that the Lehman bankruptcy was having on the global economy, with the 
phrase “Lehman Brothers” mentioned in 240 Reuters headlines alone that Monday (Reuters, 
2008b, “archives”). Though not the center of attention, Mexico received significant airtime with 
nine headline mentions. Even more telling were the verbs used to describe the actions of the 
markets in response to the uncertainty, including: “hit” (41 mentions), “falls” (22 mentions), 
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“plunge” (14 mentions), “collapse” (10 mentions) and “financial crisis” (6 mentions). “Fear” 
alone was mentioned 26 times that day, while “stress” received 28 mentions, indicating how 
rapidly market sentiment had deteriorated (Ibid). 
Risk aversion led investors around the world to “dump emerging market assets” as one 
Reuters article put it (2008c), leading those asset prices to reflect the sentiment of the market 
overall instead of their individual values. In the case of the Mexican peso, a major devaluation 
occurred just a few hours after Lehman’s collapse, indicating the presence of an information 
cascade. According to the CME data, the Mexican peso lost a full two percent of its value (based 
on average closing floor prices) from Monday to Tuesday, and continued to fall well into 
Thursday (Table: Average Floor closing prices, September 2008).  
The cascade was not lost on Mexican traders. According to Eduardo Saenger, head of 
equity trading at Bulltick Capital Markets in Mexico City, liquidity was going to be a big issue: 
“We are going [to] see that markets are going to sell off, until something very, very big happens 
to shows [sic] us a floor to stop the freefall [sic]” (as quoted in Reuters, 2008c). His comments 
indicated that until new, market-moving information was introduced to stop the “flight to 
quality” or herd away from “riskier” assets, then the peso and Mexican stock markets would 
continue to fall. This would likely make it difficult for the government, businesses and investors 
alike to acquire the cash or credit they needed for day-to-day business.  
Tuesday, September 16, 2008 
However, the events of Tuesday, September 16 served only to perpetuate the apparent 
cascade. Table 2 provides the narrative and sentiment of the day, demonstrating the growing 
sense of panic in the markets, particularly over the fate of the insurance giant AIG: 
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Table 2 Mainstream Media Headlines for Tuesday, September 16, 2008 
 
As before, a keyword analysis of the Reuters headlines archive provided a unique look at 
the sentiment in the market that day. AIG was the number one crisis-related topic with 154 
mentions, followed by mentions of a crisis (24), losses (20), a rescue (18), worries (18), turmoil 
(12) and bankruptcy (12) (Reuters, 2008d, “archives”). The financial meltdown on Monday, 
September 15 had amplified the financial struggles of insurance giant AIG, causing it to seek the 
help of the US Federal Reserve. Realizing the failure of AIG would cause more systemic risk 
within global markets, the US government set aside its “moral hazard” platform and began to 
look for a solution to the “too big to fail” problem. With talks of rescues, the use of the word 
Time 
(EDT) 
Headlines on September 16, 2008 News 
Provider 
1:02 AM Lehman in talks to sell part of firm to Barclays-WSJ Reuters 
1:43 AM Lehman bankruptcy rocks Asia  Reuters 
2:58 AM Blasts hit Mexico celebration, three dead  Reuters 
7:56 AM Automakers could use $50 billion in loans: UAW  Reuters 
8:30 AM SNAPSHOT-Global financial market stress at a glance  Reuters 
8:40 AM Paulson, Bernanke talk AIG ideas with Senate leader  Reuters 
8:49 AM GLOBAL MARKETS-Global equity selloff wreaks havoc on money mkts Reuters 
2:41 PM GLOBAL MARKETS-Stocks, oil drop as Wall St damage spreads Reuters 
3:42 PM Grenade attacks kill 8 on Mexico's national day  Reuters 
6:01 PM AIG shares sink 21 pct as cash crisis mounts  Reuters 
6:11 PM Central banks strain to contain market crisis Reuters 
7:52 PM Fed chairman, Paulson in AIG talks with Congress Reuters 
7:52 PM AIG shrs plunge as crisis mounts, takeover mulled  Reuters 
7:53 PM AIG may get $85-90 bln bridge loan in govt-brokered deal: CNBC  Reuters 
7:54 PM AIG shares pare losses in heavy after-hours trade  Reuters 
7:55 PM AIG rescue hopes, Morgan Stanley earnings, ease markets Reuters 
8:14 PM Fed chairman, Paulson in AIG talks with Congress Reuters 
8:14 PM U.S. weighs AIG conservatorship: Bloomberg  Reuters 
8:14 PM S&P likely to cut derivative deals on Lehman, AIG  Reuters 
8:14 PM No federal power for AIG conservatorship: source  Reuters 
8:16 PM INSTANT VIEW: Goldman Sachs earnings fall, stock lower Reuters 
8:16 PM Bush sees efforts to stabilize markets: White House  Reuters 
8:37 PM Paulson, Bernanke talk AIG ideas with Senate leader  Reuters 
9:32 PM GM CEO says liquidity position is "solid" Reuters 
9:45 PM Federal Reserve statement on AIG  Reuters 
 
 
84 
 
“fear” was significantly reduced to only ten mentions on Tuesday, September 16, compared to 
the 26 mentions the previous day. The most popular verbs used on Tuesday were “fall” (64 
mentions) and “cuts” (30 mentions), indicating the movement of the stock markets and the 
withdrawal of credit from the market (Ibid). 
There were only three major mentions of Mexico Tuesday, September 16 focusing on the 
country’s first ever grenade attack by the drug cartels during the drug war. Correlating with the 
lack of media mentions, the depreciation of the peso slowed from a two percent loss on Monday 
to an average of 0.09 percent loss on Tuesday. It is possible that the peso would have suffered 
more, but, as indicated by the headlines, talks of an AIG rescue were receiving most of the media 
attention that day. Overall, media coverage on Tuesday, September 16 was calmer than the 
previous day as people waited to see what would happen to AIG. 
Wednesday, September 17, 2008 
For reasons unknown, by Wednesday the markets were in a full-blown panic, with 
predictions of an all-out financial meltdown, even if the US government chose to bail out AIG. 
The sheer volume of headlines devoted to the crisis that day indicated the growing panic, as 
headlines read like play-by-plays of a basketball game. At this point, any asset that might have 
had the slightest connection to the crisis unfolding in the United States was affected by the 
negative market sentiment. By all appearances, an information cascade was in full swing, with 
severe market movements fueling provocative headlines, and volumes of headlines fueling the 
panic: 
  
 
 
85 
 
 
Table 3 Mainstream Media Headlines for Wednesday, September 17, 2008 
Time (EDT) Headlines on September 17, 2008 News Provider 
12:08 AM After AIG rescue, Fed may find more at its door  Reuters 
1:01 AM FDIC insurance fund can cover high losses -- Bair  Reuters 
2:00 AM REG-American Intnl Group AIG Statement on Announcement 
by Federal Reserve Board of $85 Billion Secured Revolving 
Credit Facility  
Reuters 
2:42 AM GLOBAL MARKETS-Stocks gain, oil rallies on AIG rescue  Reuters 
3:34 AM AIG share crash means more pain for top U.S. firms  Reuters 
4:46 AM IMF head: worst of financial crisis may lie ahead  Reuters 
5:48 AM Financial crisis will hit European growth-Austria  Reuters 
6:05 AM U.S. futures fall as AIG rescue fails to quell fears  Reuters 
8:15 AM AIG shares fall before market open  Reuters 
9:03 AM US STOCKS-Futures sink on bank credit strains, AIG  Reuters 
9:29 AM Mexico peso weakens on credit market jitters Reuters 
9:33 AM AIG's credit protection costs plunge after rescue Reuters 
9:36 AM RPT-Mexico peso weakens on credit market jitters Reuters 
9:39 AM US STOCKS-Wall St starts lower on credit strains, AIG  Reuters 
9:41 AM AIG shares drop at the market open  Reuters 
9:41 AM Fed refrains from open market operations so far  Reuters 
9:48 AM FOREX-Dollar, yen stumble as AIG rescue revives risky 
trades  
Reuters 
10:03 AM US STOCKS-Wall St slides on credit woe, AIG fallout  Reuters 
10:09 AM INSTANT VIEW: U.S. bails out insurer AIG with $85 bln loan Reuters 
10:34 AM Mexico peso extends losses on credit worries Reuters 
10:57 AM S STOCKS-Market off 2 pct on bank fears, AIG fallout Reuters 
11:09 AM Mexico peso sinks to 6-month low; stocks fall 1 pct Reuters 
12:14 PM Mexico weekly gasoline hikes to begin on Friday Reuters 
1:02 PM WRAPUP 1-Commodity markets grapple with AIG's woes  Reuters 
1:25 PM Mexico: One of the Safest Places to Invest Right Now Seeking Alpha 
2:44 PM Mexico peso sinks to 6-month low on credit worries Reuters 
3:22 PM Mexico markets slammed by global credit fears Reuters 
3:24 PM AIG orderly exit from U.S. grains heartens traders  Reuters 
3:44 PM UPDATE 1-Mexico same-store sales up 0.8 pct in August Reuters 
4:10 PM Mexico stocks shed 4.72 pct amid global credit fears  Reuters 
4:47 PM Mexico says talks advance between Cemex and Caracas Reuters 
4:47 PM Dollar falls vs. euro, yen despite AIG bailout Reuters 
5:10 PM Mexico markets slide as credit fears spur sell-off Reuters 
5:27 PM Emerging Markets-Financial, recession fears cause more 
losses  
Reuters 
5:29 PM White House says concerned about more companies Reuters 
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6:01 PM Wall St. woes force US to seek cash for Fed  Reuters 
6:01 PM GE shares down, CEO sees no need to panic  Reuters 
6:21 PM Mexico's Calderon: End tolerance of crime  Reuters 
6:46 PM Bank fears, AIG fallout drive Wall St sell-off  Reuters 
7:30 PM UPDATE 1-Mexico finmin says inflation has peaked  Reuters 
9:22 PM Fed takes heat on AIG from both sides of Congress  Reuters 
10:07 PM Auto uncertainty puts brakes on deals Reuters 
10:53 PM AIG rescue signals to Wall St that crisis not over Reuters 
11:57 PM For AIG, $85 billion might not be enough  Reuters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Tweets from Reuters US Account Conveying the Fear in Financial Markets 
 
Keywords used on this day were significantly more pessimistic. The fact that the 
government was willing to bailout AIG despite its former stance against “moral hazard” signaled 
to the markets that the risk might be more systematic than previously thought. The rescue 
temporarily rallied the markets shortly after it was approved, but the sentiment quickly turned 
sour again. Popular keywords included “down” (49 mentions), “sell” (38 mentions), and “loses” 
(22 mentions) (Reuters, 2008e, “archives”). 
Perceived risk in the market abounded because no one knew to what extent investments 
were exposed. The most-frequently mentioned nouns included “gold” in the context of buying it 
instead of stocks (67 mentions); continued discussions about an AIG “rescue” (35 mentions); 
talks of a “crisis” (34 mentions) and “exposure” to Lehman Brothers investments (28 mentions). 
The mentions of the word “fear” tripled compared to Tuesday (31 mentions versus 10), 
indicating that risk aversion was once again growing among investors. Even Mexico was 
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mentioned 22 times, primarily within the context of the financial crisis, and with occasional 
updates on the war against the drug cartels (ibid). The “flight to quality,” or in this case the flight 
to gold, meant that both the Mexican peso and stock market were negatively perceived and 
affected. The peso fell another 0.08 percent by the end of Wednesday, bringing the total loss to 
2.17 percent over the first three days of the meltdown (September 15-17). 
Thursday, September 18, 2008 
After the panic and AIG rescue on Wednesday, the markets seemed more relaxed on 
Thursday. Mainstream media reports started off negatively, reporting on the fear that the worst of 
the crisis was still to come. In response, during the early morning hours, central banks ( 20 
mentions) around the world worked to inject liquidity (17 mentions) into their markets to ease 
the problems that tight credit was creating in financial markets. As a result, markets rallied later 
Thursday morning, allowing mainstream media to focus on other events in the world such as the 
Olympics and third quarter dividends (a popular topic at 73 mentions) (Reuters, 2008f, 
“archives”). 
Table 4 Mainstream Media Headlines for Thursday, September 18, 2008 
Time (EDT) Headlines on September 18, 2008 
News 
Provider 
12:01 AM Worst Crisis Since '30s, With No End Yet in Sight  
Wall 
Street 
Journal 
12:12 AM GLOBAL MARKETS-Raw fear pummels stocks, helps bonds Reuters 
12:27 AM RPT-WRAPUP 1-Wall St dealmaking intensifies, markets tumble Reuters 
3:02 AM Wall Street woes force US to seek cash for Fed Reuters 
3:24 AM US Fed details FX swaps agreements with cenbanks Reuters 
4:46 AM Prison riot in Mexico border city kills 19  Reuters 
6:00 AM U.S. stocks futures up on coordinated cbank action Reuters 
10:28 AM Mexico peso, stocks gain on global liquidity boost  Reuters 
11:32 AM Morgan Stanley, Goldman shares tumble further Reuters 
12:05 PM US STOCKS-Market slips amid financial sector fears Reuters 
12:56 PM Mexico peso weakens sharply on credit fears Reuters 
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However, by noon on Thursday it was evident that US investment banks were still 
struggling with risk and liquidity, causing the markets and the media to reflect investor 
pessimism. While the crisis was not the major focus of mainstream media that day, there were 
still significant mentions of the word crisis (46 mentions), fear (16 mentions) and exposure (13 
mentions). By 4 p.m. EDT, the conversation took a more positive turn again with talks of a 
“solution” (58 mentions). US Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson had announced a plan for 
one big bailout to end the uncertainty in the markets. Mentions of “hope” were the highest they 
had been since Monday, September 15 at 22 mentions (Ibid). 
During this time, the Mexican peso also fluctuated with the market, as chronicled by the 
Reuters headlines. After having depreciated most of Thursday afternoon, the peso gained a little 
traction with talks of Paulson’s Toxic Asset Relief Program (TARP). In the end, the peso 
appreciated a sizable one percent by the end of Thursday. 
Friday, September 19, 2008 
Talks of a rescue plan carried into Friday, significantly lifting the mood in the markets, 
helping to eliminate some of the uncertainty. The goal of TARP was to remove the toxic assets 
1:02 PM Europe stocks fall despite liquidity boost Reuters 
1:14 PM US STOCKS-Market drops as financial-sector worries persist Reuters 
1:36 PM Mexican peso, stocks slip on credit worries Reuters 
1:55 PM Credit market meltdown Reuters 
2:00 PM Household wealth falls for third straight quarter Reuters 
2:30 PM Economy seen sluggish through mid-09 Reuters 
3:06 PM ANALYSIS-Grenade attacks raise stakes in Mexico drug war  Reuters 
3:16 PM US STOCKS-Market jumps on Paulson plan report  Reuters 
4:03 PM UPDATE 1-Mexico July industrial output falls 0.2 pct Reuters 
4:05 PM Mexico stocks surge on US rescue plan optimism Reuters 
4:11 PM Mexico detains two suspects over grenade attack  Reuters 
4:36 PM US STOCKS-Wall St rallies on crisis solution hopes Reuters 
4:37 PM Bush meets economic advisers on financial crisis Reuters 
5:00 PM Emerging Markets-Bond spreads narrow on hopes for mkt solution Reuters 
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from the market that were causing so much uncertainty. A keyword analysis showed that popular 
mentions during this time included talk of the “plan” at 134 mentions, acknowledgment of the 
“crisis” at 42 mentions, a market “rally” at 23 mentions, and “rescue” and “bailout” used 
interchangeably at 22 and 20 mentions respectively (Reuters, 2008g, “archives”). The word 
“fear” was only mentioned in one headline the entire day, and was in reference to the hedge 
funds’ fear of the discussions about new market regulations. Mexico was mentioned 12 times, 
and, with the exception of the mentions of the grenade attack from the previous day, all of the 
mentions were positively related to the “plan” talks (ibid). Therefore, the Mexican peso rallied 
into the weekend, appreciating another 1.6 percent between Friday morning and the opening of 
the markets on Monday, September 22. 
Table 5 Mainstream Media Headlines for Friday, September 19, 2008 
Time (EDT) Headlines on September 19, 2008 News Provider 
12:17 AM Mexico questions men over grenade attack  Reuters 
12:08 PM Mexico's Calderon: End tolerance of crime  Reuters 
12:08 PM Grenade attacks raise stakes in Mexico drug war  Reuters 
12:51 PM Mexico markets soar on U.S. government crisis plan  Reuters 
3:08 PM Mexico peso surges on U.S. crisis plan  Reuters 
3:47 PM NYMEX-Crude ends up over 6 pct on stability plan  Reuters 
3:50 PM U.S. moves take heat off banks for shotgun mergers  Reuters 
4:09 PM US STOCKS-Wall St rallies on U.S. rescue plan  Reuters 
4:10 PM Mexico stocks surge on hopes of U.S. credit plan  Reuters 
4:10 PM Oil posts biggest 3-day gain since 1998  Reuters 
4:56 PM 
UPDATE 1-Treasury plan seen in Congress within 24 hrs-
aides 
Reuters 
5:01 PM Mexico peso, stocks climb on U.S. crisis plan  Reuters 
6:00 PM 
TOPWRAP 6-U.S. toxic-debt plan, short-selling curbs lift 
markets  
Reuters 
6:22 PM Treasury could buy debt for 2 years under plan: report  Reuters 
7:26 PM 
CORRECTED - Emerging Markets-Stocks and bonds soar 
after U.S. bailout plan  
Reuters 
7:26 PM U.S. launches all-out attack on credit crisis  Reuters 
11:45 PM U.S. to propose $500-$800 billion asset-buy plan: sources  Reuters 
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There was a very strong, positive correlation between the sentiment of Reuters headlines 
and the volatility of the Mexican peso during the first week after the failure of the Lehman 
Brothers investment bank. The week in question represented a period of significant uncertainty 
in financial markets, prompting investors to become more risk adverse. In addition, this week 
represented a period of time when Mexico was relatively calm, experiencing no major political 
upsets, elections or natural disasters. Even when Mexico experienced its first grenade attack of 
the drug war signally possible instability within the country, the peso appreciated because the 
stock markets in the US were rallying. Thus, the volatility of the peso during this time period 
could possibly be attributed to investors trading on sentiment conveyed through media, rather 
than on new information about changes in the stability of Mexico or its macroeconomic 
fundamentals. 
Overall, the relationship between media sentiment and volatility in the peso was found to 
be positive. As articles became more pessimistic, there was stronger downward pressure on the 
average closing price of the peso. Sentiment-based information cascades were also found to be 
short-term when the macroeconomic fundamentals of Mexico did not change during the period 
of observation. As uncertainty was removed from the market with definitive talks of the US 
governments’ TARP plan, the media became less pessimistic, and the peso regained nearly all 
the value it had lost during the previous week within seven days of the initial drop in price. 
In the event that the peso had not regained its original value when the US market 
conditions improved, that would have indicated a fundamental change had occurred within 
Mexico’s economy, causing the value of the peso to remain at a depressed price as other assets 
recovered. This situation occurred on September 29, 2008, when the US Congress failed to pass 
the TARP plan the first time it was proposed. The two weeks prior to this rejection had been full 
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of discussions about how important it was for the toxic assets to be removed from the markets in 
order to prevent a global credit crisis. When the first draft of the TARP bill failed to gain the 
votes it needed, “certainty” entered the markets – specifically, the certainty that global credit 
markets were in trouble. Thus, the severe downward pressure applied to financial markets 
globally and the price of the Mexican peso was a reaction to a fundamental change in the 
markets. In this situation, the price of the peso fell because demand for the peso fell; investors 
wanted US dollars, bonds or gold more than they wanted pesos. The “flight to quality” explains 
why the value of the peso continued to fall, even once the second draft of TARP was passed. 
This prolonged devaluation adversely impacted Mexico’s domestic economy, as terms of trade 
deteriorated and access to credit was limited.  
 By December 2008, Mexico was deep in a recession, struggling with high 
unemployment and increasing levels of poverty and violence. In the two months that followed 
the approval of the second draft of TARP and the use of those funds to rescue of the US auto 
manufacturers, the Mexican peso had lost nearly a quarter of its value. The fact that the rescue of 
US auto companies with their significant ties to Mexico’s domestic economy still did not result 
in the recovery of the peso confirmed that the fundamental state of the Mexican economy had 
changed. This instability in Mexico’s economy was reflected in the value of the peso, explaining 
why the currency continued to devalue even as the recession in the United States was starting to 
ease. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Concluding Thoughts 
Ultimately, this analysis illustrated scenarios in which Mexico could be vulnerable to 
herd behavior and media sentiment from outside of its borders. Mexico’s history of financial 
crises and its close connection to the United States through trade means that the country may 
already face more investor scrutiny than other Latin American countries. It also means that 
investors’ decisions to withdraw from Mexican assets during times of financial distress in the 
United States are rational, already creating prime conditions for spurious (non-intentional) 
herding away from the peso during periods of uncertainty.   
However, with the evolution of information technology, Mexico also faces the possibility 
that a flight away from the peso could be augmented through faster information sharing and the 
instantaneous, large-volume trades initiated by HFT algorithms reacting to negative news. The 
highly visible HFT algorithm trades can over-exaggerate the fall in the price of the peso already 
initiated by naturally-occurring spurious herding among investors. The rapidity of the fall in the 
price of the peso can then create uncertainty around the peso’s true value, causing investors to 
doubt their own information even as the price falls well below the point of what the currency is 
actually worth. If the cascade is not “broken” quickly enough with the introduction of solid facts 
about the state of macroeconomic fundamentals within Mexico, the cascade has the potential to 
snowball into an inefficient, large-scale flight of capital that may have a more profound adverse 
effect on the Mexican economy as a whole. 
The presence of high-speed trading and information-sharing tools has major implications 
for Mexico. First, having strong macroeconomic fundamentals is no longer a sufficient safeguard 
against external crises. Research by Cutler et al. (1989) demonstrated how those actions might 
affect only a third of market price volatility, a conclusion that is consistent with the findings of 
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this research. As Tetlock concluded, and this analysis concurs, media sentiment plays a 
significant role in the volatility of asset prices in the markets. And while Calvo and Mendoza 
demonstrated how globalization has made it easy for investors to herd by overloading them with 
choices, this research has described how the evolution in information technology has made 
opportunities for herding in Mexican currency markets faster and more systematic through new 
research behaviors and the use of HFT algorithms. 
Second, the use of social media as a tool to gather news and the sentiment of the market 
is also becoming systemized. According to Journalist Matt Honan, Twitter is now being used as 
the “labor and delivery room of information […] help[ing] journalists find emerging information 
and sources” (2014). The same breaking news that is being fed into digital newswires and used 
by automatic trading algorithms is, in part, being sourced from social media from firsthand 
witnesses rather than trained journalists.  
In addition, as explained by the MarketWired research (2013) and Lovas of 
OneMarketData (Szalay, 2014), more investors and algorithms are starting to rely on social 
media platforms like Twitter to keep a finger on the pulse of the market. This means that when 
negative information about a company – or even a country – comes to light, that information can 
be shared and used instantaneously by investors and their algorithms to make trading decisions 
before there is time to verify its accuracy. This information can come from anywhere in the 
world and is very difficult to censor, meaning that the only way to counteract the effects of 
misinformation is to immediately publish accurate facts about the peso through sources 
considered “authoritative” by the investment community. 
While the presence of digital information technologies may present several challenges to 
the Mexican economy during periods of uncertainty, this same technology may provide the 
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Mexican government a unique opportunity to address pending economic crises. For the first 
time, social media provides emerging economies like Mexico the ability to monitor sentiment 
about their country in real time. Whole software systems have been developed specifically for 
governments to track these kinds of data, allowing governments to take a proactive approach to 
policy making and reputation management. By using social media, rather than fearing it, 
governments can contribute to the articles being written about their countries and economies; 
they can become an authoritative source of news for journalists, investors and business partners.  
In addition, social media channels can give governments a platform where they can lend 
clarity to the market in times of crisis, helping remove the uncertainty around their currency 
values that causes foreign investors to become so risk adverse. By actively monitoring sentiment 
on multiple channels, governments will have a better understanding of what investors perceive to 
be the economy’s weaknesses. They will then be able to address that uncertainty with more 
appropriate policy measures. In the end, it is imperative for governments in emerging economies 
to track the new ways markets function. Doing so may help reduce the financial resources 
needed to counteract economic crises, ultimately freeing up those funds for domestic 
development. 
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Appendix A 
Summary of the CME Group Data utilized in the form of average floor closing prices. 
Average Floor Closing Prices 
Date September December  March 
1   0.07148125   
2 0.09506875 0.07085625 0.0633625 
3 0.09445 0.0707875 0.06295 
4 0.093975 0.070875 0.06349 
5 0.0933 0.072875 0.06399 
6     0.06333 
7       
8 0.09364375 0.07144375   
9 0.09343125 0.0719625 0.06365 
10 0.0928 0.0714625 0.0629625 
11 0.092225 0.07265 0.0634 
12 0.09224375 0.07367 0.064879167 
13     0.066066667 
14       
15 0.09245 0.071825   
16 0.09045 0.0727125 0.067508333 
17 0.0903625 0.07361 0.06857 
18 0.0896 0.073035 0.06915 
19 0.090566667 0.072875 0.06965 
20     0.06812 
21       
22 0.092075 0.073175   
23 0.091675 0.072615 0.06835 
24 0.090866667 0.071955 0.0678 
25 0.090933333   0.067625 
26 0.091075 0.07198 0.068045 
27     0.0685 
28       
29 0.090175 0.071105   
30 0.088733333 0.070175 0.06758 
31   0.069205 0.06785 
        
  
Represents Weekends and Holidays. 
 The CME Exchange was closed. 
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Appendix B 
Baseline comparison of the daily average floor closing price for the peso in September 2008, 
December 2008 and March 2009. 
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Appendix C 
Daily averages and actual prices of the Mexican peso according to CME data for September 
2008, December 2008 and March 2009. 
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